Planning and Environmental Law: Uneasy Bedfellows?

Stephen Tromans QC

Summary

This paper sets out to provide an inevitably selective overview of the environmental law and policy developments in recent years and how, if at all, the planning system can contribute to meeting those objectives, or (if bad decisions are taken) detracting from them. This will involve two main strands of discussion, based on the commonly quoted idea that environmental law and policy range from very large matters (“the stratosphere”) to very local concerns (“the street corner”). First, I will consider how the planning system can contribute to modern environmental policy objectives and legal obligations, and how well or badly the National Planning Policy Framework (“NPPF”) addresses these issues. Sustainable development is not a new concept—Mrs Thatcher was advocating it in the late 1980s and much of the planning guidance cancelled by the NPPF was originally introduced to try and embed sustainable development in the planning system. Planning has a role, either by promoting development which will help to deliver the relevant objectives, or in preventing development which would be the wrong decision. However, the limitations of its role must be realised. The “golden thread” or touchstone of sustainable development used in the NPPF is not a sensible test for the planning system in itself. Leaving aside extreme instances, it is generally impossible to say with intellectual honesty whether a specific development is “sustainable” or not. Is the adjective “sustainable” used simply to provide environmental respectability for a presumption in favour of development, such as we remember from Circular 22/80? In fact if sustainability were to be applied rigorously as a test then there would be the real prospect of development finding it hits the buffers of environmental limits in matters such as clean air and sustainable water resources. Secondly, at “street corner” level, I will consider the issue which has been raised in recent cases such as Coventry v Lawrence and Barr v Biffa as to whether decisions made under the planning system, or other permitting regimes, should have any effect on restricting the private law rights of those affected by nuisance from those projects. If so, what are the possible implications for the planning system? The issue is likely to become ever more controversial as environmental and sustainability imperatives dictate the provision of waste, energy and other infrastructure. The planning system is however not geared to resolving the type of dispute which the law of nuisance is there to address.

Introduction

Some 20 years ago I presented a paper to this Conference on the emerging and exciting subject of environmental law, and its implications for planning lawyers. They were heady days when Mrs Thatcher had seemingly discovered the environment1 and the Government had just brought out the first ever White Paper on the Environment: “For generations, we have assumed that the efforts of mankind would leave the fundamental equilibrium of the world’s systems and atmosphere stable. But it is possible that with all these enormous changes (population, agricultural, use of fossil fuels), concentrated into such a short period of time, we have unwittingly begun a massive experiment with the system of this planet itself.”

1 In her speech on September 27, 1988 to the Royal Society, Mrs Thatcher raised the 3 atmospheric pollution issues of the day of greenhouse gases, the discovery of the hole in the ozone layer by the British Antarctic Survey and acid deposition, and said:

“For generations, we have assumed that the efforts of mankind would leave the fundamental equilibrium of the world’s systems and atmosphere stable. But it is possible that with all these enormous changes (population, agricultural, use of fossil fuels) concentrated into such a short period of time, we have unwittingly begun a massive experiment with the system of this planet itself.”

In her speech to the 1988 Brighton Conservative Party conference, she famously included in the section “Protecting Our World” (between The Economy and Law and Order) the words:

“No generation has a freehold on this earth. All we have is a life tenancy—with a full repairing lease. This Government intends to meet the terms of that lease in full.”
Paper devoted to the topic,\(^2\) setting out a comprehensive programme for environmental policy and drawing heavily on the concepts of sustainable development in the Brundtland Report.\(^3\) Furthermore, it was not just policy—the Environmental Protection Act 1990 had provided the United Kingdom with what appeared to be modern environmental legislation, to replace the Victoriana which had previously largely constituted our “pollution control” laws.

In fact Mrs Thatcher, speaking to the UN General Assembly in 1989, as well as announcing the investment in the science of predicting climate change which would lead to the United Kingdom becoming a world leader in that field, encapsulated the principles of sustainable development in a way remarkably similar to, yet more engagingly and clearly worded, than the drafts-persons of the National Planning Policy Framework would achieve 22 years later:\(^4\)

> “Britain has some of the leading experts in this field and I am pleased to be able to tell you that the United Kingdom will be establishing a new centre for the prediction of climate change, which will lead the effort to improve our prophetic capacity.

> It will also provide the advanced computing facilities that scientists need. And it will be open to experts from all over the world, especially from the developing countries, who can come to the United Kingdom and contribute to this vital work.

> But as well as the science, we need to get the economics right. That means first we must have continued economic growth in order to generate the wealth required to pay for the protection of the environment. But it must be growth which does not plunder the planet today and leave our children to deal with the consequences tomorrow.

> And second, we must resist the simplistic tendency to blame modern multinational industry for the damage which is being done to the environment. Far from being the villains, it is on them that we rely to do the research and find the solutions.”

The conundrum identified by Mrs Thatcher still lies at the heart of the debate over sustainable development re-ignited by the draft NPPF. It is therefore an opportune time to revisit how environmental law and policy have developed since 1990 and whether matters have become any clearer in terms of the tensions which I discussed at that time.

In considering the topic the focus is often from a planning lawyer’s point of view on how the growth of environmental law and its various regulatory manifestations impact on planning. To what extent should the planning decision makers leave environmental regulation to the environmental regulators, and what role remains for planning? These are important questions which are discussed by Greg Jones QC in his paper at this Conference. My focus is a somewhat broader one—what impact do planning decisions have on environmental law and on environmental policy objectives, given that the planning system is essentially concerned with the development and use of land?

This can be considered at two levels, both of which are important, and in a sense encapsulate the catch phrase used in the 1990 White Paper to capture the breadth of environmental issues: “from the stratosphere...”

---


\(^3\) This Common Inheritance: Britain’s Environmental Strategy” (Cm.1200, September 1990).

to the street corner”.

The two are actually linked in an interesting way. The considerations of “stratosphere” lead to the need for the provision of new and low-carbon infrastructure, such as wind turbines, energy from waste and biogas facilities, nuclear power stations, etc. These infrastructure projects will have often unwanted effects at the “street corner” or field margin level for local councils and local residents. How do the planning decisions made to provide these projects affect the balance of the law on local amenity and the standards of comfort and enjoyment of land which local residents may reasonably expect?

Environmental law and policy in 2012

Before setting off for the stratosphere, it will be helpful to remind ourselves of how environmental law and policy have moved on since the 1990 White Paper, and what are now in 2012 the key issues. The White Paper quoted John Stuart Mill’s *Principles of Political Economy* that “the Earth itself, its forests and waters, above and below the surface” are the inheritance of the human race, and that “No function of government is less optional than the regulation of these things, or more completely involved in the idea of a civilised society”. The White Paper set out a wide ranging agenda for change both at EU and domestic level, foreshadowing many initiatives which have indeed been translated into law and policy in areas such as energy efficiency, renewables, air quality and critical loads, water, waste and recycling. To that extent it is important not to lose sight of how far matters have come since 1990. It is salutary to bear in mind that in 1990, amongst other things, we were still burning huge quantities of high-sulphur domestic coal in our power stations, using polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) in industrial equipment, dumping industrial wastes, sewage sludge and mining wastes at sea, and disposing of hazardous waste in unlined “dilute and disperse” landfills. Agriculture was largely uncontrolled in terms of its effects on landscape, wildlife and water resources.

Some of the problems identified in the White Paper have largely been resolved or are a long way to being resolved. The big and intractable issues of climate change, energy, water resources, waste management, and the marine environment have of course not. What follows is my own no doubt partial and subjective overview of the most important aspects, and those which have the most important implications for the planning regime. There are numerous other initiatives which, whilst undoubtedly making a substantial contribution to sustainability objectives, do not have such direct implications for land-use and physical infrastructure provision—for example requirements as to energy efficiency under the Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy Efficiency Scheme, which came into force in 2010. Nor am I seeking to deal with measures which are essentially concerned simply with pollution control, or the restriction on use of hazardous substances.

Greenhouse gases and other emissions to air

At EU level a scheme has been introduced for the trading of allowances for greenhouse gas emissions, the third trading period for which starts in 2013. This cap and trade approach has not been without its difficulties, but represents an extremely important and significant step forward and has since been extended

---

5 The Environmental Protection Act 1990 itself demonstrated that catholicity, with provisions ranging from controlling major industrial emitters with potentially global effects, to the nuisances of dog-fouling and litter. David Cameron, when Leader of the Opposition, used (unknowingly?) the same phrase in the 2008 local election campaign when urging that green issues were “not just about the stratosphere, it’s about the street corner” with an emphasis on graffiti, fly-tipping and fly-posting (perhaps he felt dog-fouling was now under control). See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7351813.stm [Accessed October 1, 2012].

6 The latest being the recently confirmed announcement that from April 2012 all 1,200 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange will be required to include data on their greenhouse gas emissions in their annual reports, with the obligation likely to be extended to some 24,000 large UK businesses from 2016: see *The Environmentalist*, July 2012, p.5.

to emissions from aviation. The main difficulty has been the collapse of the price of allowances as the result of historic over-allocation, increased energy efficiency and economic recession. This has created a huge windfall (estimated at some €1.8 billion) for the small number of steel and cement companies which have surplus allowances. Energy companies such as Shell and E.on have called on the Commission to withdraw at least €1.4 billion allowances. This problem will need to be addressed by some means before the start of the third trading phase in 2013–2020. Another key issue is that of “carbon leakage”—the increase in emissions outside the European Union which is the result of constraining emissions within the European Union—which itself presents very difficult regulatory problems.

The prospect of emerging technology for the capture and storage of carbon dioxide has led to another area of EU regulation and will no doubt in due course present its own land use planning and permitting challenges. As with so much else in this area, its progress is dependent on the economics being conducive to funding—it has been estimated that a carbon price of about €30/tonne is necessary to attract the investment needed, whereas the price in April 2012 was at an all time low of just over €6/tonne.

The role of local authorities in delivering climate change targets, both through the services they deliver and their regulatory role was highlighted in the Climate Change Committee’s May 2012 report, How Local Authorities Can Reduce Emissions and Manage Climate Risk. The role is significant in terms of energy efficiency, buildings, transport and waste, and through planning permissions for renewable projects. The Committee recommended that local authorities should draw up low-carbon plans which include a high ambition level ambition for emissions reduction (e.g. 20 per cent reduction across buildings, surface transport and waste by 2020 relative to 2010 levels) but focus on drivers of emissions over which they have influence (e.g. number of homes insulated, car miles travelled). The Town and Country Planning Association has provided helpful and detailed guidance and model policies in this area.

The advent of targets for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions under the Climate Change Act 2008 has been the basis of some challenges to decisions on infrastructure such as airports, though with mixed success. In R. (on the application of Hillingdon LBC) v Secretary of State for Transport, Carnwath L.J. (as he then was) sitting in the Administrative Court, referred to evidence of “a powerful demonstration of the potential significance of developments in climate change policy since the 2003 White Paper [on air transport]”. Support for a third runway at Heathrow, pending production of the national policy statement, could not be regarded as immutable and was subject to review in the light of developments such as the national commitments imposed under the Climate Change Act 2008. On the other hand a challenge on similar grounds to the expansion of aircraft numbers at London City Airport failed in R. (on the application of Griffin) v Newham LBC.

There has been much discussion on setting a carbon floor price to encourage investment in low carbon electricity generation, the price rising over time. Supplies of fossil fuels used for electricity generation will be subject to carbon price support rates after April 1, 2013 and will result in electricity prices rising until around 2030 as more low-carbon capacity comes on stream. These signals will again, over time,
have their effect on the balance of electricity generation and on the infrastructure required to produce and distribute it.

Whilst progress on greenhouse gas controls is being made at UK and EU level, and is beginning elsewhere, such as in Australia and California, there has so far been a failure to achieve meaningful progress at the international level and after the Durban climate change conference in December 2011 and the follow up at Rio+20 in June 2012, it has to be admitted that two decades of international effort based on the Kyoto Protocol have resulted in no commitment to take steps to mitigate climate change. Essentially, there is now a “two speed carbon world”, some countries with differing carbon prices, but most without, giving rise to trade distortions by effectively subsidising industries which are not internalising the global costs of the carbon emissions they produce. The recent report of the House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee puts it as follows:

“There is a clear divergence between the UK’s territorial emissions and its consumption-based emissions. The UK’s territorial emissions have been going down, while the UK’s consumption-based emissions, overall, have been going up. The rate at which the UK’s consumption-based emissions have increased have far offset any emissions savings from the decrease in territorial emissions. This means that the UK is contributing to a net increase in global emissions.

We conclude that there are two main reasons for the fall in the UK’s territorial emissions, neither of which were a result of the Government’s climate policy: the switch from coal to gas-fired electricity generation in the 1990s, which was driven by privatisation of the electricity sector; and the shift in manufacturing industries away from the UK in response to the pressures of globalised markets. The latter led to an increase in consumption-emissions as the UK imported goods it previously manufactured domestically. However, the rate at which the UK’s consumption-based emissions are increasing is also indicative of increasing levels of consumption.”

Given the dominance of foreign imported goods to the UK economy, embedded carbon is an important issue, which may perhaps only be addressed by what are called border carbon adjustments, a term which generically covers mechanisms such as tariffs, requirements for importers to purchase emissions allowances, and embedded carbon product standards. The long-term consequences for industries which depend on that import and export trade, ports in particular, should be obvious.

The reduction of carbon dioxide emissions from road vehicles remains a difficult issue. The European Commission acknowledges that its goal of reducing emissions from new cars to 120g/km by 2012 will not be achieved and is looking at new longer term targets. Plainly a technological breakthrough in vehicle technology, if and when it occurs, would have major implications for future policy.

---

18 See the depressingly vacuous “renewed commitment”, The Future We Want, which emerged from Rio at http://www.unccd2012.org/content/documents/727/The%20Future%20We%20Want%20June%202012%20%28pm%29.pdf [Accessed October 1, 2012].
21 For an engaging account of the developments in containerisation, the associated vessels and port infrastructure which form the background to this phenomenon, see Marc Levinson, The Box—How the Shipping Container made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006).
22 See Andrew Simms writing in the The Guardian: “If I want to own and enjoy a cheap, garage-sized TV, all the fossil fuel emissions that result from making it don't get added to my home account, but to the country of manufacture, most probably China. As a result, the origins of demand and the place of consumption become insulated from environmental consequences. Worse still, as the latest, most comprehensive set of figures on the hidden trade in ‘embodied carbon’ reveal, it allows countries such as the UK and the US to delude themselves, by suggesting that the real problems in tackling climate change lay elsewhere, and to dangerously misunderstand the scale of domestic challenges.” See http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/01/carbon-accounting-emissions-imported-goods [Accessed October 1, 2012]. Such carbon flows are massive and are growing in commodities such as clothing, steel, automotive products, and the like: see the detailed analysis at http://www.carbontrust.com/our-clients/il/international-carbon-flows [Accessed October 1, 2012].
Considering air quality more generally, it seems clear that EU air quality legislation, in particular Directive 2008/50 on ambient air quality, is not fully successful in delivering the desired results especially in relation to limit and target values for particulates, nitrogen dioxide and ground-level ozone in urban areas. A major public consultation exercise was launched in 2011 and a new clean air strategy package is intended to be adopted in 2013. In the meantime urban air quality remains a serious health issue in many parts of Europe, including at times the United Kingdom. In 2011 the European Commission demanded a plan from the UK Government to avoid any further breach of PM10 (small particulates) limits, on the basis of which the Commission agreed not to pursue legal action for historic breaches going back to 2005. This at present involves measures such as transport dust suppressants, steps at industrial and construction sites with levels of coarse particulate, and the planting of vegetation and “green walls” to trap particulates rather than more substantial preventive measures. The Commission is however clearly not satisfied with progress and has recently refused to allow the United Kingdom to defer meeting its obligations except for 12 zones where it could be demonstrated that nitrogen dioxide limits could be met by 2015. The United Kingdom’s application for extension admitted that targets would not be met until at least 2020 in some 16 areas, and not until 2025 in London.

Energy

Energy is an intractable area. At EU level the Commission adopted its Communication Energy Roadmap 2050, which explores the challenges presented by its long-term goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to between 80–95 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050, while ensuring security of supply. This will involve a step up from the already ambitious Energy 2020 goals. It makes the critical point that “Uncertainty is a major barrier to investment” which could be adopted as the leitmotif of energy law and policy. Electricity will play a greater role and there will be a transition to an energy system based on higher capital expenditure, with major investment needed in generation and transmission systems, energy efficiency and insulation, smart meters, low carbon vehicles, local renewable energy equipment, etc. In all scenarios, the contribution of renewables will have to rise considerably, to about 55 per cent of gross final energy consumption by 2050, compared with about 10 per cent today. Carbon capture and storage will also have to play a pivotal role.

Directive 2009/28 on the promotion of energy from renewable sources requires Member States to ensure that the share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy in 2020 is at least its national overall target under the Directive, the UK target being 15 per cent. The 2009 UK
National Renewables Action Plan,\textsuperscript{31} required under art.4 of the Directive, is intended to set out the proposed trajectory and measures for meeting the UK target, but is a highly technical document, intended for European Commission consumption, from which few clear answers emerge.

In the United Kingdom 2011 saw the approval of the six energy national policy statements covering general policy (EN-1), fossil fuels (EN-2), renewable energy infrastructure (EN-3), gas supply and gas and oil pipelines (EN-4), electricity networks infrastructure (EN-5) and nuclear power generation (EN-6). Of these only nuclear is location-specific.

At the same time the Government is currently embarked on a major programme of energy market reform, following the energy White Paper, \textit{Planning Our Electric Future},\textsuperscript{32} published in July 2011 and seeking to face the formidable multiple challenges of security of supply as existing generating plants close, the need to decarbonise generation, and the likely trends to 2050 of rising electricity demand and rising electricity prices.

The levels of subsidy available for renewable energy schemes are critical to levels of investment and hence the number of projects coming forward. The award of renewable obligations certificates (“ROCs”) which can be sold to electricity supply companies has been the main driver in the expansion of onshore wind schemes and other projects such as landfill gas. Investment decisions are made on the rate of ROCs issued per MW/ hr generated and uncertainty over future levels of support undoubtedly has a chilling effect, hence the concern of the onshore wind industry to the perceived wish of the Treasury to reduce further the level of support for onshore wind below the reduced 0.9 per MW/ hr proposed by DECC for the period 2013–2017 (intended to reflect cost improvements and deter schemes in areas of low wind resource).\textsuperscript{33}

The Energy Bill, published in draft on May 22, 2012,\textsuperscript{34} has already aroused substantial controversy in many areas.\textsuperscript{35} It will from 2017 replace the renewables obligation, which has been since 2002 the main means of incentivising investment in large-scale renewable, nuclear and carbon capture projects with a Contracts-for-Differences system to provide long-term revenue certainty for investors, as would the earlier, bespoke, “investment instruments” which the Government may offer to individual investors. These market signals can be expected to have significant effects on how, when and where the massive development in energy infrastructure which is contemplated will come forward.

However, the problem of energy security, to be achieved in the short term, and the long term goal of energy decarbonisation, seem unlikely to be entirely compatible when push comes to shove. The current costs speak for themselves. As of June 2012, offshore wind energy costs about £140 per MW/ hr to produce, onshore wind about £80, and gas £40–70. The signals are certainly there in comments made in the 2012 Budget by George Osborne that “Gas is cheap, has much less carbon than coal and will be the largest single source of our electricity in the coming years”, coupled with the announcement that gas fired power stations will not have to meet $\text{CO}_2$ emission performance standards requiring carbon capture until 2045.\textsuperscript{36}

It may be, as in the US, that the governing factor will be the ability to tap domestic resources of the “unconventional hydrocarbons”, such as shale gas\textsuperscript{37} or the less controversial coal bed methane.

\textsuperscript{33} ENDS Report July 18, 2012: Renewable energy subsidy decisions delayed.
\textsuperscript{35} Being described for example as “misleading, manipulative and destructive” by George Monbiot in \textit{The Guardian}—see \url{http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/georgemonbiot/2012/may/31/energy-bill-destructive-daveys-claims} [Accessed October 1, 2012]. See also ENDS Report No.449. June 2012, p.13.
\textsuperscript{36} See ENDS Report 446, March 2012, p.36.
In the area of waste, technical standards have been raised by the requirements of the Landfill Directive, and waste has had to be diverted away from landfill to the various forms of re-use, recycling or recovery, a process assisted by economic instruments in terms of the Landfill Tax and local authority tradable allowances ("LATS") for biodegradable municipal waste. The need to pre-treat waste has had, as we shall see, consequences in terms of the odorous nature of the waste and its impact on residents living around landfill sites.

Domestic waste policies have in fact been relatively successful. Over 40 per cent of household waste is now recycled, compared with 11 per cent in 2000/2001. Initiatives to increase the capacity for cost-effective waste re-use, recovery and recycling mean that the costs of such options now compare very favourably with the cost of landfill, though there remain some regional disparities. The review of waste policies by DEFRA in 2011 suggested that it is on course to meet the EU landfill diversion target to reduce by 2013 the proportion of biodegradable waste sent to landfill by 50 per cent of 1995 levels, proposed abolishing the LATS scheme as no longer needed, and proposed consulting on increased recycling targets for plastic, steel, aluminium and glass. Landfill bans for wood and other possible materials such as textiles and metals are also in contemplation. The increase of waste recovery from material such as food waste, sewage sludge and agricultural manures and slurries through anaerobic digestion is also a priority, with publication in 2011 of the Anaerobic Digestion Strategy and Action Plan. These policies will see the need for schemes for more waste treatment facilities at local level, and an important issue is the need to educate local planning authorities and the public in the issues and benefits of such schemes.

Sectoral schemes have been developed and incorporated into EU law to deal with particular waste streams such as packaging waste, waste electrical and electronic equipment, and end of life vehicles, all based on the concept of producer responsibility. These set increasingly stringent targets for material-specific recycling, though in many cases the actual recycling takes place in locations such as China rather than the United Kingdom.

Having agonised for some years over the delivery of waste infrastructure for energy from waste, pre-treatment, gasification, biomass, etc, it now appears on the latest figures that by 2015 the United Kingdom as a whole (like Germany) may have an oversupply of such facilities. There will however be regional shortfalls in capacity. The disposal of hazardous waste streams (such as waste electrical equipment, oil for regeneration, air pollution control residues, contaminated soil for bioremediation, ships for recycling and hazardous waste landfill—the last resort) is likely to involve a limited number of major facilities according to the draft National Policy Statement ("NPS") on Hazardous Waste. Such facilities seem unlikely to receive the warmest of welcomes by the local authorities or communities where they are proposed. The draft caused a frisson of concern among the waste industry with its proposed requirement

---


ENDS Report July 16, 2012: Gate fees for recycling continue to fall.


In respect of which the resulting export trade has given rise to its own controversies under Community law—see e.g Criminal Proceedings against Garenfeld (C-405/10) [2012] Env. L.R. D3, a case concerning export of spent catalytic converters from Germany via The Netherlands to Lebanon.


for the promoters of such schemes to carry out a “community stress and anxiety assessment” and it is worth setting out the paragraphs from the House of Commons Select Committee report on this point:

“53. Industry representatives expressed concern about the requirements which the NPS placed on them to carry out a ‘community stress and anxiety assessment’. CIWM drew attention to the ‘paucity of guidance’ about how such assessments should be conducted which was likely to lead to ‘significant dispute’ about both the assessment process and the analysis of results. The ESA agreed, telling us that they felt that this part of the NPS was ‘almost a throwaway section’ and that it was ‘very unclear exactly what the company is expected to do—what sort of assessment, what sort of ways it could seek to allay anxiety and stress that was seen to be there’.

55. We recognise that it may be desirable for there to be a degree of flexibility about how stress and anxiety assessments are conducted, depending on the circumstances of the application. This does not obviate the need for clarity about the purpose and expected outcome of such an assessment. Despite DEFRA’s assurances, it is clear that developers face an unacceptable degree of uncertainty in interpreting how stress and anxiety assessments should be undertaken. We recommend that the draft NPS be amended to include guidance on how community stress and anxiety assessments should be carried out.”

Perhaps not surprisingly, in its response to the Select Committee, the Government indicated that “having given the matter further thought”, it had decided to drop the requirement for this assessment, on the basis that the NPS would require the decision-maker to take account of health concerns when setting conditions, and that consultees would be able to express their anxieties during the pre-application consultation and determination stages.

Water

The last paper which I gave at this Conference, in 2001, was entitled “Too Much or Too Little—Water Management and the Land Use Planning System” and dealt with the issues of water resources and flooding. A decade later, 2012 has so far been a year including both widespread drought conditions, and also the wettest late spring/early summer on record for almost a century, with widespread local flooding. Sir Michael Pitt’s review of the summer 2007 floods urged comprehensive legislation. This has not come about, though the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 has implemented a number of the Review’s recommendations and clarifies the statutory responsibilities for managing flood risk. The Act (s.27) requires flood and coastal erosion risk management authorities to aim to contribute towards the achievement of sustainable development when exercising their flood and coastal erosion risk management functions. Statutory guidance on that duty has been issued by DEFRA. Interestingly, that guidance resists the temptation to try and provide a precise interpretation of sustainable development: “... sustainable development is an evolving concept that seeks to respond to these concerns in the way we manage our society, economy and environment. We cannot, and should not, try to pin it down too narrowly” (para.2.5). Rather, at para.3.1, it lists a number of matters which sustainable development in this context will include: taking account of the safety and wellbeing of people and the ecosystems upon which they depend; using

49 HC 540, Government’s Interim Response (July 17, 2012) para.12.

finite resources efficiently and minimising waste; taking action to avoid exposing current and future
generations to increasing risk; and improving the resilience of communities, the economy and the natural,
historic, built and social environment to current and future risks.

The Flood and Water Management Act will work in tandem with the Flood Risk Regulations 2009,\textsuperscript{54} which transpose the EU Floods Directive 2007/60/ and require the formal assessment of areas at serious risk of flooding, the preparation of flood risk maps\textsuperscript{55} and flood risk management plans, as well as placing the Environment Agency and relevant local authorities under a duty of co-operation. Given that over five million people in England and Wales live or work in properties (one in seven) at risk of flooding,\textsuperscript{56} this can be genuinely said to be an issue of national importance. The House of Commons Environment Committee has twice reiterated its deep concern as to the expiry in 2013 of the interim “Statement of Principles” agreed between the Government and the Association of British Insurers in 2008, under which insurance is provided to properties in areas of flood risk. Withdrawal of that cover would lead to a serious danger of blight, with significant impacts on the housing market and on social cohesion.\textsuperscript{57}

Unfortunately, lessons are clearly not being learned. The Adaptation Sub-Committee of the Committee on Climate Change in its July 2012 progress report presented the following sobering message on new development at risk of flooding:\textsuperscript{58}

“Indicators show that development in the floodplain in England increased by 12% over the past ten years compared with a 7% increase outside the floodplain. Around 21,000 homes and business premises (13% of all new development) have been built in the floodplain every year over this time period.

Planning policy ensures that this development is generally well protected from flooding. The majority of floodplain development proceeded in line with Environment Agency advice, because the developer incorporated adaptation features, such as raised ground and floor levels or safe evacuation routes.

However, our analysis raises some questions about implementation of the policy. While over 80% of floodplain development took place in locations well protected from flooding with community defences, one in five properties built in the floodplain were in areas of significant flood risk under today’s climate.

In addition, the approval process is not sufficiently transparent or accountable. The Environment Agency only knew whether or not their advice had been followed in 65% of planning applications where they had objected.

Development in the floodplain may be a rational decision in cases where the wider social and economic benefits outweigh the flood risk, even when accounting for climate change. However, from a review of 42 of the most up to date local development plans we found mixed evidence on whether or not local authorities were transparently: assessing the potential for accommodating growth elsewhere before deciding to allocate land for development in the floodplain; or accounting for the long-term

\textsuperscript{54} Flood Risk Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/3042).
\textsuperscript{57} Future Flood and Water Management Legislation (HC 522, First report of Session 2010–2012) paras 40–41; The Water White Paper (HC 374, Second Report of Session 2010–2012) para.31. The Joseph Rowntree Trust has also highlighted the fact that climate change adaptation policies should have not only a spatial dimension but also should incorporate social justice by identifying and responding to groups which are most vulnerable in terms of the economic and social ability to adapt to and recover from climate change related events: see Jean Welstead, Socially Just Adaptation to Climate Change (July 13, 2012) at http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/socially-just-adaptation-climate-change [Accessed October 1, 2012].
\textsuperscript{58} Climate Change—is the UK preparing for flooding and water scarcity? at http://hmcc.c.s3.amazonaws.com/ASC/2012%26report/CCC_ASC_2012_Spreads.pdf [Accessed October 1, 2012]. See also the Impact Assessment on the NPPF (DCLG, July 2012) pointing out (p.26) that 9% of new dwellings were built in areas of high flood risk in 2010.
costs of flooding with climate change, both in terms of the increasing costs of flood damage and any additional costs of flood protection.”

The shortage of water resources in some parts of the country is, equally, no laughing matter. Despite this summer’s heavy rain, groundwater resources have yet to recover from the effects of a series of exceptionally dry winters and many aquifers remain at levels equivalent to those of the 1976 drought. Careful management of water resources will therefore continue to be a significant issue, which both the land use planning system and water resource management planning will have to face. The White Paper, *Water for Life*, published in December 2011, makes the case for legislative action to avoid the security of water supplies being compromised. As well as the need for secure and affordable water supplies for its population, the United Kingdom will need to make very substantial advances in the proportion of water bodies which have properly functioning ecosystems if it is to comply with its obligations under the EU Water Framework Directive 2000/60. There is a major problem looming here. Household water usage has increased dramatically since the 1950s and demographic change will only increase the pressure as development is concentrated in areas which are already stressed in terms of water resources. Some scenarios suggest a growth of as much as 35 per cent in demand by 2050. There will be a need for investment in water infrastructure, both in major and smaller projects, and in the means of moving water around in bulk to meet demand, with interconnection and bulk water trading. The current legal regime on abstraction, dating from the 1960s, is in need of reform. The White Paper also makes clear that a new mindset will be necessary under the planning system:

“4.16 More houses and commercial properties are needed to meet the needs of a growing population, changing lifestyles, and to enable economic growth. However, houses and offices should not be built until the water and sewerage infrastructure serving the development is sufficient to ensure the environment is not placed at risk. This requires close dialogue and collaboration between local authorities, the Environment Agency, developers and water companies, so that the parties can balance the needs of the economy and society for new development, the environment, and the bills to customers.”

This very clear statement of Government policy is however not reflected in the NPPF save in very general and anodyne form at paras 156 and 162, which suggest the need to assess the quality and capacity of infrastructure for transport, water supply, wastewater, energy, and other forms of physical and social infrastructure, and its ability to meet forecast demands. This work will however require, as the White Paper acknowledges, constructive engagement between local authorities and the relevant bodies as local plans are prepared, effective input by the water companies into that process, and robust data on which the water companies can base their own water resource management plans and price review business plans for submission to Ofwat. As identified by the House of Commons Environment Select Committee in its June 2012 report on the Water White Paper, it will also need a more joined-up approach to the opportunities to provide long distance interconnection which may be presented by other major infrastructure projects—as
with United Utilities’ “putting ideas into the pot” suggestion of a water pipeline running alongside the High Speed 2 railway line.  

**Food security**

Do environmental lawyers regard food and food security as an aspect of environmental law or planners regard it as an aspect of planning law or policy? The answer is probably not … yet. Food production and distribution are not topics to be found in environmental texts, journals, seminars or courses. The interest is probably peripheral, related to matters such as Genetically Modified Organisms, pesticides and water use. Yet food security and the environmental impacts of feeding the United Kingdom are probably among the most important issues which will face government over the next few decades. Many warning signs are already there. The system is hopelessly unsustainable and looks increasingly precarious. It has been estimated by the UK Government that by 2030 the world will require 50 per cent more food than is currently produced, as compared with 45 per cent more energy and 30 per cent more water. The United Kingdom will not be immune to these pressures.

When I learnt and taught law at Cambridge in the 1970s and 80s, UK food production was still an important issue in legal terms. Memories of the U-boat blockade meant that legislation and policies were in place to encourage domestic food production and to safeguard prime agricultural land as a natural asset. Government policy is now largely laissez-faire. The RTPI has correctly pointed out that preserving green belt land means that agricultural land located there will be close to major markets, with low food miles and potentially greater sustainability advantages.

In 2008, the Cabinet Office published what was probably the first comprehensive review of the food security and related environmental issues facing the United Kingdom. Matters have not improved since then—the problems are manifold and include: nitrogen pollution from fertilisers, now regarded by the European Union as one of its major environmental problems; the huge carbon and water footprint of producing and transporting the contents of the average family’s shopping basket; the abhorrent animal welfare practices involved in industrialised agriculture as illustrated by recent proposals for “super-dairies” and the increasing numbers of dairy cows kept permanently indoors on a “zero-grazing” system; the catastrophic loss of biodiversity in the UK countryside from monoculture; the massive and rising costs of waste food disposal, falling on local councils, as a result of the cynical over-promotion of perishable food by supermarket retailers; and the unhealthy diet of a large proportion of the UK’s population, leading to disease, obesity and waste of NHS resources.

In a 2008 discussion paper, DEFRA defined food security as: “consumers having access at all times to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets all their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. That is an inadequate approach. It pays no heed to the environmental consequences and to the inherent sustainability. If by “food preferences” it means that those who wish to eat strawberries in January should have access to them at all times, then I respectfully disagree. It is a much more serious issue.

The Government is only just beginning to grapple with these issues through initiatives such as the Green Food Project, the first report of which was published in July 2012, looking at ways of seeking to reconcile

---

67 Caroline Spelman, Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Green Futures, June 2012).
68 RTPI, Planning for Food (August 2010).
70 Ensuring the UK’s food security in a changing world (July 2008).
more efficient food production with environmental objectives.\textsuperscript{71} Time is not on Britain’s side. It currently imports over 40 per cent of food consumed, and that proportion is rising.\textsuperscript{72} Early 2008 saw a huge spike in food price rises on global markets, bringing to an end a period of decline in the relative price of food in the United Kingdom. There is significant vulnerability to the effects of emerging diseases such as the bluetongue virus, transmitted by midges which have migrated north as a result of climate change, and the Ug99 strain of “wheat rust” fungus, which since 1999 has spread steadily from Uganda. Types of crop diseases in the United Kingdom will change with warmer and wetter winters, and the marked decline in insect pollinators is a further serious cause for concern.

Taking these matters into account, it is unfortunate that the NPPF policy protecting the country’s best and most versatile agricultural land is so weak:

“112. Local planning authorities should take into account the economic and other benefits of the best and most versatile agricultural land. Where significant development of agricultural land is demonstrated to be necessary, local planning authorities should seek to use areas of poorer quality land in preference to that of a higher quality.”

It is perhaps not surprising, though regrettable, that this is the case, since the equivalent policies in PPS 7, though fuller, were also weak.\textsuperscript{73} Preserving the country’s future ability to feed itself is about as fundamental an aspect of sustainability as one could find, along with preserving clean water and healthy ecological systems. Successive Governments have taken their eye off this particular ball, and need to get it back on again.

There are however potential resonances with the Government’s localism agenda which may be exploited. Initiatives in the 2011 White Paper, \textit{The Natural Choice—Securing the value of nature}\textsuperscript{74} included helping local authorities use their new duties and powers on public health, creating a “Local Green Areas” designation to allow local protection of green space, establishment of a Green Infrastructure Partnership to support development of green infrastructure, including allotments, and launching a new phase of volunteering opportunities—for example community food-growing projects. Unlike so many aspects of the planning system, this is an area where communities, without major infrastructure investment, can be the key. The planning system, especially at the new local level, has potentially a huge role to play here. A network of community allotments and schemes for sharing gardens should be instituted and encouraged. The Localism Act’s provisions and the community right to bid to buy community assets\textsuperscript{75} could be extremely important here. Yet the section in the NPPF on “Promoting Healthy Communities” contains not a single reference to food.

\textit{The marine environment}

Protection of the marine environment in terms of law and policy, though sadly not in terms of the actuality,\textsuperscript{76} has improved massively since 1990. At EU level the Marine Strategy Framework Directive 2008/56 is an


\textsuperscript{72} See \url{http://www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/issue/uk.html} [Accessed October 1, 2012].

\textsuperscript{73} PPS7: Sustainable Development in Rural Areas (2004) paras 28, 29. See \url{http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuilding/pdf/147402.pdf} [Accessed October 1, 2012]. For a recent case in which the Secretary of State was held to have misconstrued the PPS 7 policy as involving the need to avoid loss of the best and most versatile agricultural land “unless absolutely unavoidable”, see Fox Strategic Land and Property Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] EWHC 444 (Admin) at [62]–[63] per H.H. Judge Gilbart QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge.

\textsuperscript{74} Cm.2082.


\textsuperscript{76} The authoritative assessment of the state of the UK marine environment, \textit{Charting Progress 2}, published in 2010, refers to continued decline of populations of seabirds and seals, the continued unsustainable exploitation of fish stocks, and the problem of plastic litter and damage to the seabed and its species from fishing and physical structures. On the other hand, estuaries are now much cleaner and heavy metal and other toxic pollution is greatly reduced. See \url{http://chartingprogress.defra.gov.uk/} [Accessed October 1, 2012].
important first step.77 The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 set out a planning and control process. The UK Marine Policy Statement (“MPS”), made pursuant to the MSFA Directive78 was jointly published by the administrations in March 2011 and provides the overall policy framework for the development of sub-national marine plans and for making authorisation and enforcement decisions.79 It sets out the high level principles for “achieving a sustainable marine environment” as well as policy objectives for key marine activities such as offshore energy infrastructure, shipping, tourism and telecommunications. As the UK Marine Policy Statement makes clear, the system has much in common with town and country planning, being a plan led system which should rest on a sound evidence base:

“1.1.1 The MPS and Marine Plans form a new plan-led system for marine activities. They will provide for greater coherence in policy and a forward-looking, proactive and spatial planning approach to the management of the marine area, its resources, and the activities and interactions that take place within it.”

Marine and terrestrial planning cannot exist in hermetically sealed isolation and as the Policy Statement makes clear will require careful steps to ensure effective integration:

“1.3.4 Integration of marine and terrestrial planning will be achieved through:
• Consistency between marine and terrestrial policy documents and guidance. Terrestrial planning policy and development plan documents already include policies addressing coastal and estuarine planning. Marine policy guidance and plans will seek to complement rather than replace these, recognising that both systems may adapt and evolve over time;
• Liaison between respective responsible authorities for terrestrial and marine planning, including in plan development, implementation and review stages. This will help ensure, for example, that developments in the marine environment are supported by the appropriate infrastructure on land and reflected in terrestrial development plans, and vice versa; and
• Sharing the evidence base and data where relevant and appropriate so as to achieve consistency in the data used in plan making and decisions.”

The Stratosphere

The terms stratosphere and strategy have a common root: the Greek stratos or Latin stratus, meaning that which is spread out. The areas of environmental policy described above have extensive implications going far beyond the land use planning system, or decisions or plans made by local planning authorities. How then can the planning system, and its underlying policies, as now set forth in the National Planning Policy Framework (“NPPF”), contribute to these strategic, and in some cases stratospheric, issues?

The NPPF seeks to do no more than set out the Government’s planning policies for England.80 It does not contain specific policies for nationally significant infrastructure projects falling within the decision-making process of the Planning Act 2008 (which are provided by the national policy statements made under that legislation)81 nor specific policies on waste (which are part of the National Waste Management Plan).82

78 See the Marine Strategy Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/1627) imposing a duty to develop a marine strategy.
80 NPPF para.1.
81 NPPF para.3.
82 NPPF para.5.
As is well known, the NPPF describes the presumption in favour of sustainable development as being “a golden thread running through both plan making and policy making” (para.14). Policies in local plans are to be based upon and reflect that presumption, with clear policies guiding how the presumption should be applied locally and making it clear that development which is “sustainable” can be approved without delay (para.15). It will also, according to the NPPF, have implications for how communities engage in neighbourhood planning (para.16) and as a “core principle” planning should “proactively drive and support sustainable development” (para.17 third bullet point). Planning should “encourage and not act as an impediment to sustainable growth” (para.19) and policies should positively and proactively encourage “sustainable economic growth” (para.21 first bullet point). The “sustainable growth and expansion” of all types of business and enterprise in rural areas is to be encouraged and “sustainable rural tourism and leisure developments” (para.28 first and third bullet point).

The NPPF contains many traditional planning policies on matters such as building a strong economy, ensuring the vitality of town centres, supporting a prosperous rural economy, delivering a wide choice of high quality housing, requiring good design, creating healthy and inclusive communities, ensuring a sufficient choice of school places, access to open space and recreational opportunities, protecting green belt land, seeking to mitigate and adapt to climate change and associated flood risk, supporting a move to a low-carbon future, conserving the natural environment and biodiversity, ensuring adequate supplies of minerals and aggregates, etc. All of these policies are perfectly intelligible without using the words “sustainable” or “sustainable development” at all. Indeed the NPPF states that these policies and the others at paras 18–219, taken as a whole, constitute the Government’s view of what sustainable development in England means in practice for the planning system (para.6).

The elephant in the corner is what is meant by “sustainable” in all the contexts mentioned in the NPPF and whether in fact it is a quite meaningless touchstone. For some matters, such as transport, it may be reasonably clear that some forms are more sustainable than others, if sustainability is simply treated as a surrogate for relative greenhouse gas emissions. But plainly even there it is relatively meaningless in most contexts, since what might be thought by many to be “unsustainable” modes have no negative presumption, but rather simply there is a requirement to explore and maximise sustainable solutions.83

In its section on “Achieving Sustainable Development”, the NPPF refers to the UN General Assembly Resolution 42/187 which defined sustainable development as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. It also cites the five “guiding principles” of the UK Sustainable Development Strategy Securing the Future: living within the planet’s environmental limits; ensuring a strong, healthy and just society, achieving a sustainable economy, promoting good governance, and using sound science responsibly.

UN Resolution 42/187 was the one which received and endorsed the Brundtland Report and needs to be read in its proper context of a very broad policy statement set as a guiding principle for the future development of international law. It concurred with the Commission that a number of very broad objectives followed from the need for sustainable development:84

“… preserving peace, reviving growth and changing its quality, remedying the problems of poverty and satisfying human needs, addressing the problems of population growth and of conserving and enhancing the resource base, reorienting technology and managing risk, and merging environment and economics in decision-making.”

83 NPPF paras 29–41.
It is a classic example of “soft law” in the international environmental context, which may be highly influential but lacks any legal force and is essentially of an aspirational nature. As defined in one work, it is:

“A term used to refer to non-binding instruments or documents which have the appearance of law …While not legally binding, soft law can be politically influential in setting down objectives and aspirations.”

Equally the passage referred to in the 2005 UK Sustainable Development Strategy, with its five guiding principles, applies the broadest of broad brushes. Sustainable development was seen as the cure to all the world’s ills, as exemplified by the speech by Tony Blair to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, quoted at p.12:

“We know the problems. A child in Africa dies every three seconds from famine, disease or conflict. We know that if climate change is not stopped, all parts of the world will suffer. Some will even be destroyed, and we know the solution—sustainable development.”

It was replete with similar clichés, such as “Living on the earth’s income rather than eroding its capital”, “living within environmental limits”, “fair principles for the sound management of the planet”, “a comprehensive set of wellbeing indicators”, etc. The “guiding principles” set out at p.16 of the Strategy are not in fact a definition of sustainable development, but “the set of shared UK principles used to achieve our sustainable development purpose”. As was made clear in the much more substantive 1995 UK Sustainable Development Strategy, produced by John Major’s Government, “sustainable development is, inevitably, a long-term process.”

Part of the Labour Government’s legacy was the creation of the Sustainable Development Commission, disbanded on March 31, 2011 after its funding was withdrawn. In its last report, Governing for the Future—The Opportunities for Mainstreaming Sustainable Development, the Commission provided a very clear overview of how sustainable development should work, its holistic nature and its architecture. It is “not a singular, prescribed outcome” but a continuous process, a “systems-based approach for achieving positive, enduring change”. It requires holistic thinking for the long term: “development” implies progress and improvement, while “sustainable” suggests resilience, long-termism and future-proofing. “Short-term thinking is the biggest risk to sustainable development.” It involves the mechanisms of performance management frameworks, delivery plans and tools, monitoring and reporting.

Nowhere does the Sustainable Development Commission suggest that it is, or should be, a test for distinguishing between good and bad, or acceptable and unacceptable, “development” in the narrow town and country planning sense. The closest one gets is the Sustainable Development Commission’s 2008 report on Local Decision Making and Sustainable Development, where it is said at Annex A:

“Delivering sustainable development should involve planning for the long-term, fully integrating economic, social and environmental factors into decision making and considering impacts beyond the local area.”

The fallacy inherent in the NPPF is that it is possible to judge in any meaningful, reliable or indeed transparent and fair way, whether a particular form of development, growth or expansion is “sustainable”

87 Cm.2426, January 1994, para.1.6.
or not. The matter was expressed with great clarity by former Parliamentary draftsman and inveterate writer of letters to *The Times*, Francis Bennion:

“With wide experience as a parliamentary draftsman accustomed to framing statutory definitions, I am astonished that heavy weight should be placed on such an inadequate term. It will cause prolonged argument at almost every future planning hearing.

The document contains no proper definition of the term ‘sustainable development’. It says ‘Sustainable means ensuring that better lives for ourselves don’t mean worse lives for future generations’. What sort of definition is that?

The document also says ‘Resolution 42/187 of the United Nations General Assembly defined sustainable development as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’ That is no better as a definition.

The document adds: ‘The policies in paragraphs 18 to 219, taken as a whole, constitute the Government’s view of what sustainable development in England means in practice for the planning system.’ Are planning hearings really going to have to plough through over two hundred paragraphs of this document every time there is argument about whether a proposed development is ‘sustainable’? The Government should think again.”

It is perhaps ironic that such an imprecise concept should have been made the “golden thread” of planning policy at the same time that the Supreme Court has provided a salutary reminder that the meaning of planning policies, as distinct from their application to a given set of facts, is an objective question of construction, not one for a “Humpty-Dumpty” of giving the words the meaning the reader would like them to have. To sustain is a verb, derived from the Latin sustinere, meaning to uphold, to bear up, or to support. As an adjective applied to development it has no clear meaning. As a term of art, even one of its main proponents, Sir Crispin Tickell, has said that it is: “… an elusive and elastic concept and for most people it still lacks a coherent definition”.

It is interesting to remind ourselves that back in 1990, a focus of the environment White Paper, in the whole part devoted to land use, was a systematic review, updating, extension and revision of existing planning guidance. This involved expanding and strengthening, significantly, the suite of PPGs, with new guidance on archaeology, heritage, wildlife and planning, and on planning, pollution control and waste management, to give a few examples. Much of the detail of that work has now been lost.

Sustainable development only gains real meaning when translated into clear objectives. If clear national or local policies can help to deliver those objectives, all well and good. But I would query whether the focus is sufficiently clear. It is plainly not sustainable to continue building homes in areas which are at risk of repeated flooding, yet this practice seems to continue. To encourage as many people as possible to cycle, either as a means of transport or for pleasure, is plainly an extremely sustainable objective, and one to which the localism approach might be thought well suited. Yet even on basic matters such as ensuring safe facilities for those who would like to cycle, performance of many local authorities is poor.

The shallowness of the sustainable development concept in the NPPF was exposed mercilessly in entertaining written evidence from Professor David Fisk, previously Chief Scientist and policy director

---


91 Much the same point was made in evidence to the House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee in its inquiry into the draft NPPF by the Planning Officers’ Society: “What that is saying is that you have a definition that runs to 52 pages whose conclusions will inevitably point in all sorts of different directions” (Eighth Report of Session 2010–2012, HC 1526 para.51) at [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmcomloc/1526/152602.htm](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmcomloc/1526/152602.htm) [Accessed October 1, 2012].


at the Department of Environment, and one of the most respected environmental civil servants of his day. Professor Fisk’s evidence on what he called “a Frankenstein fusion of conflicting ideas” includes the following:95

“The draft NPPF quotes the Brundtland definition of sustainable development … In the 1980s ‘sustainable’ (as in ‘sustainable fisheries’, ‘sustainable forestry’) just meant what it said on the tin. Subsequent interminable redefinitions seem largely to curtail or redirect its meaning rather than add light. The Brundtland Report itself was a 300 page review of major global policy areas. The scope is breath taking. It not only included issues like biodiversity but issues long since shunted elsewhere like arms proliferation, over population, and sprawling megacities … The Brundtland definition then only sets the Commission’s idea of scale—big issues over large timescales. That it might be applied to a proposal for a lap dancing club in Broadway High Street might have struck the Commission as perplexing.

It is hard for an external reader not to guess that this section has been shoe-horned in from Departments that neither understand the background to the Brundtland Commission, how planning actually works and what currently motivates applications in England. The first difficulty is that ‘development’ in planning has a different gloss from ‘development’ in the rarefied text of Brundtland … The hypothetical lap dancing club would be a sustainable development if it paid its bills. The collateral damage of that success would not, as the text is written, seem to be a material issue.

Perhaps the real difficulty is that the English have forgotten what the planning system was for. If people work just to pay taxes so as to fund large public sector vanity projects, then maybe tax revenue generating lap dancing clubs and hypermarkets plonked anywhere are fine. But suppose people work principally so they can enjoy their home, live in communities of people they like and bring up their families in localities spared cycles of degeneration and fitful regeneration. In a nation that, especially in the South East, is beginning to look conspicuously overdeveloped, overpopulated and over tarmaced compared with competing centres in Mainland Europe, the draft NPPF may indeed be following the Brundtland prescription: a quick fix to a current problem that passes on an unmanageable future liability for the real heart of what drives the English economy, its people.

The planning system cannot hope in itself to deliver the nirvana of sustainable development, though bad planning decisions can of course negate that goal. Delivery will involve a whole raft of policy areas outside the planning system. However it can provide a policy framework which will hopefully discourage or prevent development which runs counter to the principles underlying sustainability, and can encourage or facilitate development which will provide more sustainable ways of producing energy, food, housing, employment etc. Planning policies can provide the stability necessary to take the long-term view and to resist the temptation of short-term decisions which lead to outcomes that are not in the interests of sustainability.

As already discussed, some aspects of sustainability require a strategic approach. Quite plainly, air and water do not recognise local administrative boundaries, nor is it safe or realistic to assume that each local authority can plan in a self contained way for its necessary energy and waste infrastructure (for example). So for example in respect of renewable energy, prior to the Localism Act 2011, it was clear that the regional level was seen as the most appropriate for making decisions on key renewable targets and broad areas.96 Equally the provision of strategic waste facilities was a matter apt for regional resource estimates, targets and criteria-based policies.

Regional planning forms no part of the localism agenda. The provision for abolition of regional strategies in the Localism Act s.109, is accompanied by the new duty in s.33A of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 on local planning authorities and other prescribed bodies to co-operate in relation to strategic matters”, defined by s.33A(4) to include “sustainable development or use of land for or in connection with infrastructure that is strategic and has or would have a significant impact on at least two planning areas.” It is plain already that this will have major legal implications, and will be an immediate point of scrutiny for PINS, as in the case of objections raised at the hearing in June 2012 of the North London Waste Plan as to lack of consultation with regional waste bodies outside London. It is not something that will lend itself to formulaic or “tick-box” approaches and will involve some difficult discussion on which there may be deep disagreement as to which is the right solution in terms of sustainability.

One interesting feature of the NPPF is the emphasis in local plan making on meeting objectively assessed needs, “unless any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in this Framework taken as a whole”. Much speculation has arisen over what these words will mean in practice. Presumably both the adverse impacts and the benefits of the proposal need to be assessed in the light of the policies in the NPPF. Some impacts (most notably a significant effect on a protected European habitat) will be trump cards in this regard. But for others this will not be a straightforward weighing exercise, made more complex perhaps by the words “significantly and demonstrably”.

The 2011 White Paper, The Natural Choice: Securing the Value of Nature, proceeds on the premise that the benefits of the natural environment are not properly valued and pledges to put natural capital at the centre of economic thinking. The concepts of ecosystem services and natural capital currently play little by way of a prominent role in the planning system, but this seems likely to change as the White Paper’s policies and initiatives feed through. The House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee in its July 2012 report on the Natural Environment White Paper was heavily critical of the Government for failing to integrate its approaches into planning and transport policy.

“84. It is disappointing that the opportunity was not taken to integrate the principles and policies in the Natural Environment White Paper within the National Planning Policy Framework. We recommend that the Department for Communities and Local Government publish guidance as to how planning bodies should take into account the benefits of the natural environment when determining planning applications. In particular this guidance should set out how planners and developers can protect the environment in areas designated as Nature Improvement Areas.

85. The Government must ensure that local planning bodies finalise their local plans which should demonstrate a link between the principle of protecting and enhancing nature and planning decisions.”
The concepts enshrined in the White Paper will presumably, if the work being undertaken is to mean anything, have the capability to demonstrate the weight and significance of adverse impacts on components of natural capital and to counteract the benefits of meeting the “objectively assessed needs”.

As the ground-breaking work on the UK National Ecosystem Assessment ("UKNEA") published in June 2011 makes clear in its findings, there are broad ranging implications for how planning decisions will be made in future:

“Of the range of services delivered in the UK by eight broad aquatic and terrestrial habitat types and their constituent biodiversity, about 30% have been assessed as currently declining. Many others are in a reduced or degraded state, including marine fisheries, wild species diversity and some of the services provided by soils. Reductions in ecosystem services are associated with declines in habitat extent or condition and changes in biodiversity, although the exact relationship between biodiversity and the ecosystem services it underpins is still incompletely understood.

Contemporary economic and participatory techniques allow us to estimate values for a wide range of ecosystem services. Applying these to scenarios of plausible futures shows that allowing decisions to be guided by market prices alone forgoes opportunities for major enhancements in ecosystem services, with negative consequences for social well-being. Recognising the value of ecosystem services more fully would allow the UK to move towards a more sustainable future, in which the benefits of ecosystem services are better realised and more equitably distributed.

This will need the involvement of a range of different actors—government, the private sector, voluntary organisations and civil society at large—in processes that are open and transparent enough to facilitate dialogue and collaboration and allow necessary trade-offs to be understood and agreed on when making decisions.”

It is important to appreciate that this exercise is not one of seeking to reduce every asset or attribute to a monetary value. That is an approach which has been tried and discredited. Rather, the UKNEA recognises that some considerations relating to the natural environment are not based on utility and are essentially non-monetary, for example ethical, spiritual, cultural and aesthetic considerations which translate into health values (both mental and physical) and shared social values. The challenge lies in how those considerations are to be balanced. Diminution of natural capital therefore may affect not only the health and well-being of the current population, but also that of future generations which inherit a diminished or damaged asset.

Sir Gus O’Donnell has famously in recent months listed planning reform as one of the three main policy failures in his civil service career. His words are relevant here:

“For my third failure I will use a microeconomic example; namely, the failure to agree on a planning system that achieves our desired goals. Every time there is a recession, or even a reduction in growth below trend, there is a call for more ‘structural reforms’. Top of the list is always the planning system. It is blamed for holding back growth and development.

The problem is, in fact, a classic example of not being clear about the outcome that is desired. If it is to boost GDP, then the answer is simple: concrete over the South East. But of course that’s not

103 See http://uknea.unep-wcmc.org/Resources/tabid/82/Default.aspx [Accessed October 1, 2012]. This is an independent, peer-reviewed study involving over 500 natural scientists, economists, and social scientists.

104 See, e.g. the 1994 paper by John Adams, The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Debates, discussing the 1971 Roskill Commission into the third London Airport: “Cost-benefit analysis fails an elementary political test. It does not convince. It is proffered by economists to politicians and government officials as a method for making decisions about controversial issues. But, far from resolving controversy, CBA has itself become a focus of conflict. ‘Horse and rabbit stew’, ‘nonsense on stilts’, ‘insidious poison in the body politik’, ‘Vogon economics’, and ‘the economics of genocide’ are but a few of the more colourful epithets that have been directed at CBA over the last three decades.” See http://john-adams.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2006/The%20role%20of%20cost-benefit%20analysis%20in%20environmental%20debates.pdf [Accessed October 1, 2012].

105 See the discussion at pp.32ff of the UKNEA.

what we want and that’s because you would have to be an idiot to want to maximise GDP. It’s a highly flawed measure and I am pleased that we are at last starting to think more broadly about how as a society we measure success. … The good news is that we are starting to apply the best economics to these issues. I am hopeful that the recent advances in methods of valuing environmental goods and bads will help decision makers make better choices once they are clear about what they want to achieve.”

Another component of sustainable development is recognising and living within environmental limits. One can pay lip service to this or one can apply it seriously. If the latter, then the implications for the localism agenda are significant. Before its abolition, the Sustainable Development Commission produced a report, *Know Your Environmental Limits—a Local Leaders’ Guide*,[^107] which was intended to redress the general ignorance of the concept. It said this on the question of what local governance bodies can do:

- **set ambitious local environmental limits** which will enable current and future generations within the local area to live healthily and equitably. The limits should be set in discussion with, and with support from, local people and community groups. Central government should also be called upon in order to utilise the latest monitoring data available and to ensure a consistent, nationwide spatial approach
- develop, in partnership with the local community, a **long-term vision** for protecting and enhancing the natural environment that recognises the value the environment provides in supporting all public services. This vision should be based on the environmental limits set for the local area, as above. It should then be incorporated into all other plans and strategies, for example for economic regeneration, housing, transport, and spatial planning
- **take stock and monitor** the status of local environmental assets and progress towards the long-term vision. For example, maintain up-to-date records on Biodiversity Action Plans, green space availability and quality, air quality levels and cultural assets, and compare to the local environmental limits—this may include existing target levels and proxy limits. **Report and communicate** details and progress against the limits to communities for transparency and dialogue, and to central government as mediator
- **raise awareness** of environmental limits and **provide advice** to the wider community on how to reduce pressure on the environment.

There have been some many urban civilizations before our own which proved not to be sustainable in the sense that they crashed, sometimes dramatically, for reasons ranging from damage to the environmental base on which they rested to the mounting costs in human, economic and organisational terms of maintaining them.[^108] Some of the past reasons, such as overpopulation, water resources and the like apply equally today, but we have added the further possible causes of energy shortage, climate change, the build-up of toxic materials in the environment, and so on.[^109]

So to summarise, how does the planning system, taken as a whole and now including marine planning, fit with the ideal of sustainable development? The key point is perhaps that “development”, i.e. physical built development and its location, is not the same concept as “development” when coupled with “sustainable” in the Brundtland sense. “Sustainable development” seeks to describe a form of progress which holds economic, social (in the broadest, inter-generational sense) and environmental factors in balance, or creative tension, and seeks outcomes which provide gains in all three terms. Decisions made by the planning system are a very minor component of this. Much more important, arguably, are decisions


[^109]: See the prize-winning book, Jared Diamond, Professor of Geography at the University of California, *Collapse—How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (Viking Press, 2005).
made as to the manner in which businesses operate, the goods and services they produce, and how they are consumed. Techniques such as life-cycle assessment, providing tools to allow companies to measure and reduce the environmental impacts of their products across their whole lives, have now passed from their period of infancy into mainstream use, backed up by objective standards such as ISO 14040 and ISO 14044. What will be central in this respect is how multinational companies respond to the sustainability issue, as for example General Electric with its “Ecomagination” strategy launched in 2005, and described by the Washington Post as “… the most dramatic example yet of a green revolution that is quietly transforming global business”. Land-use planners fool themselves if they imagine that anything they can do will have anything like the impact of such developments.

Yet planning can of course play its part in preventing built development which will make it harder to achieve these ends, and in facilitating development which will promote them. A proposed project could at one level be highly “sustainable” in contributing to resource efficiency, clean energy, etc, but be in a bad location in land use terms. The role of the planning system is to balance these factors. Terming the development “unsustainable” because it is in a bad location adds nothing to that process. The converse approach is to ask what weight should be given to certain types of project (onshore wind being a key example, but there are many others) which may justify some degree of harm in land use location terms. That question leads us straight in to the next part of this paper.

The street corner

The Directives, legislation and policies discussed above on matters such as waste recycling and renewable energy will inevitably feed through (indeed are already doing so) into decisions on land use, since the necessary facilities must be located somewhere. Tension between these imperatives and environmental protection is not confined to the United Kingdom. For example, in Azienda Agro-Zootecnica Franchini Sarl v. Regione Puglia the first Chamber of the European Court of Justice had to consider a ban by the Regional Authority on commercial windfarms within the Alta Murgia national park on the basis that such projects were “totally inappropriate” in areas designated as of importance under the Birds and Habitats Directives. This was said to be contrary to provisions of Directive 2001/77 on the promotion of energy from renewable resources, recital 2 of which provides that:

“The promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources is a high [European Union] priority … for reasons of security and diversification of energy supply, of environmental protection and of social and economic cohesion …”

The court found that it was permissible for a Member State to set more stringent controls on such development than were provided for by the Birds and Habitats Directives and that there was no principle that the emphasis on development of new renewable energy capacity should take precedence over the environmental objectives of those Directives, subject to the measure not being either discriminatory or disproportionate. Somewhat similarly, a dispute arose in European Air Transport SA v College d’environnement de la Region de Bruxelles-Capitale as to the compatibility of a national system of penalties for aircraft breaching ground limits on noise with Directive 2002/30 on the introduction of noise related
operating restrictions at Community airports and the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation. The court held that the national legislation was not an “operating restriction” which was contrary to the Directive.\textsuperscript{116}

To take the NPPF as being as good a starting point as any, para.120 of the Framework reads:

“To prevent unacceptable risks from pollution and land instability, planning policies and decisions should ensure that new development is appropriate for its location. The effects (including cumulative effects) of pollution on health, the natural environment or general amenity, and the potential sensitivity of the area or proposed development to adverse effects from pollution, should be taken into account…”

Then para.122 goes on:

“In doing so, local planning authorities should focus on whether the development itself is an acceptable use of the land, and the impact of the use, rather than the control of processes or emissions themselves where these are subject to approval under pollution control regimes. Local planning authorities should assume that these regimes will operate effectively. Equally, where a planning decision has been made on a particular development, the planning issues should not be revisited through the permitting regimes operated by pollution control authorities.”

And according to para.123:

“Planning policies and decisions should aim to:

• avoid noise from giving rise to significant adverse impacts on health and quality of life as a result of new development;
• mitigate and reduce to a minimum other adverse impacts on health and quality of life arising from noise from new development, including through the use of conditions;
• recognise that development will often create some noise and existing businesses wanting to develop in continuance of their business should not have unreasonable restrictions put on them because of changes in nearby land uses since they were established; and
• identify and protect areas of tranquillity which have remained relatively undisturbed by noise and are prized for their recreational and amenity value for this reason.”

A key benefit of the planning system should be to increase certainty that land use conflicts will not arise. As termed by the 2010 Penfold Review of Non-Planning Consents,\textsuperscript{117} and endorsed by the Commons Communities and Local Government Committee in its report on the NPPF, this is the “abattoir effect”:\textsuperscript{118}

“… the certainty the planning system gives to developers that, having made an investment, they will not see it devalued by, for example, planning permission being granted for an abattoir next to their residential or office development.”

It could also be argued that the reverse should be true and that operators of abattoirs (for example) should have some certainty that housing development will not be permitted on their doorstep. That however is not always the case. Planning permission may be, and not infrequently is, granted for housing development which may potentially be affected by odor or noise from existing industrial operations. A recent example is the grant of planning permission on appeal for over 100 homes, 78 of which would be within 250m of an Anglian Water sewage treatment works in rural Suffolk.\textsuperscript{119} The inspector found no clear

\textsuperscript{116} European Air Transport SA v Collège d’Environnement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale (C-120/10) [2012] 1 C.M.L.R. 19.


\textsuperscript{119} Planning magazine, “In Focus”, July13, 2012, p.25.
guidance on what constitutes an unambiguous threshold for development around a rural sewage works, but reasoned that a significant loss of amenity could occur at levels that would not be defined as a statutory nuisance. He rejected the proposed 300–400m “cordon sanitaire” proposed by Anglian Water as not based on any policy. Anglian Water had in fact not objected to allocation of the site for housing in the adopted local plan in 2006, nor in the adopted core strategy in 2010.

Centuries before planning law was enacted, the protection against adverse impacts on health or quality of life (using the language of the NPPF para.123) was mainly derived from the common law, in particular private nuisance and public nuisance. To these two forms of nuisance the Victorian public health legislators added statutory nuisance.

A private nuisance is an unreasonable level of interference with the reasonable comfort and enjoyment by an individual of land in which they have some proprietary interest, or which affects that land itself. It is not concerned with fault.

“At common law, if I am sued for a nuisance, and the nuisance is proved, it is no defence on my part to say, and to prove, that I have taken all reasonable care to prevent it.”

A public nuisance may, as was said in one case, be “made up of a collection of private nuisances occurring more or less simultaneously”, but it could also be an act or state of affairs which affects the community in general, whether or not those affected would have the right to sue for private nuisance. Public nuisance is concerned with the infringement of public rights, not private rights.

Statutory nuisance is based on a situation where there is either prejudice to health or a nuisance, and for this purpose the nuisance must be either a public or a private nuisance. The common factor is that the law seeks to control land use in either the public or private interest by way of injunction to restrain uses which give rise to an actionable nuisance, or alternatively seek to compensate in damages the individual or individuals affected.

Private nuisance of necessity involves striking a balance between the competing rights of the parties before it: the claimant’s right to enjoyment of their land free from disturbance and inconvenience; the defendant’s right to use their land for lawful purposes. The time-honoured formulation of the test is that stated by Knight Bruce V.-C. in 1851 in Walter v Selfe: “… an inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and simple notions among the English people.”

One problem which defendants in nuisance actions undoubtedly face is that the plain and simple notions of English people have become less forgiving since 1851. Cities are no longer subjected to the noise,
smoke and smells which communities would have taken in their stride, or at least phlegmatically, at the time of Dickens. Industry has largely moved out of city centres and few of the old “offensive trades” now remain. Those living in rural locations tend to value quiet environmental conditions highly, and will see the introduction of “industrial activity”, whether wind farms or intensive livestock units, as alien and unwelcome. Accordingly, where there are activities which generate significant noise or odours, whether in urban or rural environments, trouble probably lies ahead.

The problem will often be operations which result in sporadic interference over a protracted period. The developer or operator would ideally like the certainty of clear thresholds in terms of intensity, frequency or duration, within which the facility can operate with legal impunity. The courts have declined to incorporate such an approach into the common law of nuisance. This can be seen from the decision in Barr v Biffa Waste Services, discussed below, and more recently in Pusey v Somerset CC, in which Patten L.J. said:

26. “A threshold is a useful tool for the purpose of regulating a potentially intrusive activity which should be allowed to continue in the future but subject to restrictions on its frequency and duration. In this way its impact on the claimants can be limited and local residents who are most directly affected by an intermittent but noisy activity such as power-boat or motor racing can regulate their lives accordingly …

27. But, as Carnwath L.J. emphasised in Barr v Biffa (supra), these were all cases in which the setting of maximum noise levels and a limited number of race days could make life tolerable for the claimants. Thresholds are not a legitimate means of establishing whether the degree of interference which the claimant has experienced amounts to an actionable nuisance. This is a matter of evaluating the effect of the particular incidents complained of. There is no suggestion in this case that the use of the lay-by could be regulated in this way.”

Moreover, one needs to look at the cumulative effect of the defendant’s activity, as again Patten L.J. made clear ([31]):

“… As the decision in Barr v Biffa illustrates, one can have a situation where the source of the alleged nuisance is an operation which continues over a prolonged period during which some level of interference will be experienced. The claimants in Barr v Biffa rarely, if ever, were free of all odorous emissions. But they were only entitled to recover damages for the occasions or periods when the odour levels from the waste tip became unreasonable in the sense that it was unreasonable for the claimants to be expected to tolerate them. In all such cases there is the potential for overlap between the effect of the worst periods of interference and the cumulative effect of lesser incidents. But the court has to approach its task in an objective manner and decide whether there have been occasions when the average resident in the place of the claimants would have been adversely and unreasonably affected by what was happening on his neighbour’s land. For this purpose, everything has to be taken into account but any particular sensitivities of the actual claimants are excluded.”

Writing in 1989, Conor Gearty described a High Court private nuisance action (as opposed to the numerous complaints of statutory nuisance dealt with every week by environmental health departments)
as “a source of surprise and nostalgia”. That is no longer the case—as will be seen from the decisions discussed here, private nuisance has enjoyed a startling renaissance in the past decade or so.

**Nationally significant infrastructure projects**

Nationally significant infrastructure projects (“NSIP”) authorised under the Planning Act 2008 may benefit from certain immunities in respect of private and statutory nuisance. This follows from s.158 which provides:

**“Nuisance: statutory authority**

(1) This subsection confers statutory authority for—

(a) carrying out development for which consent is granted by an order granting development consent;

(b) doing anything else authorised by an order granting development consent.

(2) Statutory authority under subsection (1) is conferred only for the purpose of providing a defence in civil or criminal proceedings for nuisance.

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) are subject to any contrary provision made in any particular case by an order granting development consent.”

In addition, Sch.5 Pt 1, dealing with ancillary matters in development consent orders provides for the imposition or exclusion of obligations or liability in respect of acts or omissions. These provisions are supplemented by s.152, which provides for statutory compensation to be paid to any person whose land is injuriously affected by the carrying out of the authorised works.

This means that the issues of such possible nuisance will need to be explored at the consenting stage as, for example, paras 4.14.1–4.14.3 of the NPS on Ports makes clear:

**“4.14.1 Section 158 of the Planning Act 2008 confers statutory authority for carrying out development consented to by, or doing anything else authorised by, a development consent order. Such authority is conferred only for the purpose of providing a defence in any civil or criminal proceedings for nuisance. This would include a defence for proceedings for nuisance under Part III of the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 1990 (statutory nuisance), but only to the extent that the nuisance is the inevitable consequence of what has been authorised. The defence does not extinguish the local authority’s duties under Part III of the EPA 1990 to inspect its area and take reasonable steps to investigate complaints of statutory nuisance and to serve an abatement notice where satisfied of its existence, likely occurrence or recurrence. The defence is not intended to extend to proceedings where the matter is ‘prejudicial to health’ and not a nuisance.**

**4.14.2 It is very important that, at the application stage of an NSIP, possible sources of nuisance under section 79(1) of the 1990 Act and how they may be mitigated or limited are considered by the decision-maker so that appropriate requirements can be included in any subsequent order granting development consent.**

**4.14.3 The decision-maker should note that the defence of statutory authority is subject to any contrary provision made by the decision-maker in any particular case in a development consent order (section 158(3)). Therefore, subject to paragraph 4.14.1, the decision-maker can disapply the defence of statutory authority in whole or in part, in any particular case,**


134 Meaning the development for which consent is granted and anything else authorised by an order granting development consent (Planning Act 2008 s.152(3)).
but in doing so should have regard to whether any particular nuisance is an inevitable consequence of the development.”

**Character of the locality**

The character of the locality in which the alleged nuisance occurs has long been part of the law of nuisance when assessing the reasonable standard of comfort which the claimant should expect. It is interesting to put this in historical context in that at the time the modern law was being established during the Industrial Revolution, the character of certain areas was changing markedly with the establishment of concentrated industries, such as the alkali works of St Helens in Lancashire and the forges and foundries of Wolverhampton. The eastern part of London had since the 16th century been seen as “base” and “filthy”, the “Easterly Pyle” where the “stink industries” such as dye making, chemical manufacture, manure, lamp black, glue and paraffin congregated, a position consolidated with the springing up of the new industrial districts of Canning Town, Silvertown and Beckton.135

Against that background, the comments of Cozens-Hardy L.J. in *Rusmer v Polsue & Alferi Ltd* in 1905, whilst politically incorrect by today’s standards, make sense136:

“A resident in such a neighbourhood must put up with a certain amount of noise. The standard of comfort differs according to the situation of the property and the class of people who inhabit it. This idea is expressed by Thesiger L.J. in *Sturges v Bridgman*, when he said that what might be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not be a nuisance in Bermondsey. But whatever the standard of comfort in a particular district may be, I think the addition of a fresh noise caused by the defendant’s works may be so substantial as to create a legal nuisance. It does not follow that because I live, say, in the manufacturing part of Sheffield I cannot complain if a steam-hammer is introduced next door, and so worked as to render sleep at night almost impossible, although previously to its introduction my house was a reasonably comfortable abode, having regard to the local standard; and it would be no answer to say that the steam-hammer is of the most modern approved pattern and is reasonably worked. In short, if a substantial addition is found as a fact in any particular case, it is no answer to say that the neighbourhood is noisy, and that the defendant’s machinery is of first-class character. … The lower standard of comfort existing, say, in Whitechapel would equally exist in one of the numerous districts which have sprung up in late years on the outskirts of the City, and which are occupied by persons of the same class as those who occupy the older houses in Whitechapel.”

The character of the locality was in issue in the case of *Dennis v Ministry of Defence*,137 the case involving noise from Harrier jump-jets at RAF Wittering. The airfield had been in use for military purposes since 1916. The introduction of Harriers in 1969 resulted in much higher levels of noise. Buckley J in considering the nature of the locality commented as follows:

“34. I regard such activities which generate extreme noise or other pollution as extraordinary uses of land, even in this day and age. They may well be justified by other considerations but not, in my view, as ordinary use. Nor do I think that a consideration of the character of the neighbourhood tips the balance against finding the Harriers a nuisance. The area remains essentially rural, with villages and individual residences. As Mr Wood submitted it would be odd if a potential tortfeasor could itself so alter the character of the neighbourhood over the years as to create a nuisance with impunity.

---

136 *Rusmer v Polsue & Alferi Ltd* [1906] 1 Ch. 234 at 250–251. Approved by the House of Lords at *Rusmer v Polsue & Alferi Ltd* [1907] A.C. 121 at 123.
137 *Dennis v Ministry of Defence* [2003] EWHC 793 (QB); [2003] Env. L.R. 34.
35. As to the common law’s approach to industrial development and the evolution of society generally, and at the risk of over simplification, the following observations may be relevant. The development of railways, canals, roads, large factories or plants and airports has largely proceeded pursuant to statutory authority or control. Planning controls were introduced in the 1940’s and public enquiries also became fashionable. Clearly such major developments in any society will interfere with the private enjoyment of nearby land. The private interests so affected have been dealt with in various ways, including: compulsory purchase, grant schemes and compensation. Statute can, of course, deal expressly with the right to bring actions, either preserving or prohibiting them. The common law has contributed by restricting the alleged tortfeasor to disturbances that are reasonably necessary in carrying out the undertaking that has been authorised. However, there is no statute in question here and the MOD is not subject to planning controls. The land was purchased originally in the usual way, so far as I am aware. All that has happened is that with the development of the jet engine and the vertical takeoff capability of, for example, the Harrier, the noise made by military aircraft has escalated. It is not surprising that no proceedings or, so far as I know complaints, arose in the early years since the aircraft then were not so noisy and the country was twice at war. However, with the introduction of the V-bombers and more particularly the Harriers, matters changed dramatically. I have already outlined the history of complaints that followed. To an extent a court can only take a neighbourhood as it finds it, but that cannot permit an undertaking in an area such as the one in question here to generate an ever increasing level of noise.”

“Normal” planning permissions

In the 2012 Court of Appeal decision in Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence,138 Jackson L.J. summarised the law on the relationship between planning permission and nuisance in four propositions ([65]):

- A planning authority by the grant of planning permission cannot authorise the commission of a nuisance.
- Nevertheless the grant of planning permission followed by the implementation of such permission may change the character of a locality.
- It is a question of fact in every case whether the grant of planning permission followed by steps to implement such permission do have the effect of changing the character of the locality.
- If the character of a locality is changed as a consequence of planning permission having been granted and implemented, then:
  - the question whether particular activities in that locality constitute a nuisance must be decided against the background of its changed character;
  - one consequence may be that otherwise offensive activities in that locality cease to constitute a nuisance.

In arriving at these propositions, Jackson L.J. observed at [53]:

“The first point to note is that the planning system exists to protect the public interest, not to protect private interests: see PPG1: General Policy and Principles, paragraph 17 (first version, 1988), and The Planning System: General Principles, published by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in 2005, paragraph 29 (and still current). Nevertheless both grants and refusals of planning permission

---

138 Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence. Permission has been granted by the Supreme Court to appeal against this decision.
impact upon private interests, sometimes to a substantial extent. Grants of planning permission may result in the character of an area being changed, with consequential effects upon private rights.”

This passage highlights immediately something of a conundrum. It is clear both from policy and from case law that purely private interests are not what the planning system is about. In the Environmental Impact Assessment context, for example, the fact that a proposed house extension may affect the environmental amenity of a neighbour, even decisively, does not equate to a significant effect on the environment, requiring assessment.\(^{139}\) That is of course not to say that the planning system is deaf to such effects, or that they are incapable of being material considerations. The impact of noise, odour or dust from a proposed development on one or more local residents will of course be relevant in deciding whether the proposed development is acceptable, or what conditions should be imposed to mitigate such effects.

The point is simply that the planning system, unlike the law of nuisance, is not there to adjudicate between the competing interests of neighbours. This is equally the case where a planning authority proposes to allow new residential development in an area of existing noisy or odorous industry, in the hope that the industry may relocate: according to the decision of Simon Brown J. (as he then was) in *R. v Exeter CC Ex p. JL Thomas & Co Ltd*,\(^{140}\) where he said:

“Thomas and the other industrial users have no legitimate expectation that other conflicting uses will never be introduced into the vicinity; the planning permissions which they obtained and enjoy confer upon them no right to commit nuisances against their neighbours either now or in the future.

… It is in my judgment perfectly proper for a planning authority to wish to encourage residential development in a particular area even if it contains existing industrial users. It is legitimate also for the planning authority to recognise and accept that planning permission for residential development in such an area is likely to give rise to conflicts with those existing users. It is also perfectly proper for the authority to harbour the wider aspiration that the existing users will relocate, whether influenced by carrot or stick. The one thing that would flaw the authority’s decision is if they were concerned to promote rather than minimise the conflict, which I am satisfied is not this case.”

In *Coventry*, there had been a long-running history of the stadium owned by the defendant and used for various motorsports. There had been a certificate of lawful use and a series of temporary planning permissions subject to conditions governing time of use and noise levels and culminating in a permanent planning permission in 2002. The claimants bought their house, some 500 metres from the Stadium, in 2006. Jackson L.J. commented that over the years:

“… careful consideration was given to the differing interests of those who lived in the locality. On the one hand there was a need to protect residents close to the Track from undue disturbance. On the other hand there was a recognition that the facility for motocross racing performed a valuable social function … It can be seen that in the planning permission finally granted the council struck a balance between the conflicting interests which were in play.”

In these circumstances the Court of Appeal rejected the conclusion of the first instance judge that noise from the Stadium amounted to a nuisance. Jackson L.J. put it thus:

“69. In January 2006, when the claimants purchased Fenland, the position was this. For the last thirteen years various forms of motor sports had been taking place at the Stadium and the Track on numerous occasions throughout the year. These noisy activities, regarded by some

\(^{139}\) See *R. (on the application of Loader) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government* [2012] EWCA Civ 869 per Pill L.J. at [46]. See also *R. (on the application of Malster) v Ipswich Town Football Club* [2001] EWHC 711 (Admin) at [73] per Sullivan J. (as he then was).

as recreation and by others as an unwelcome disturbance, were an established feature, indeed a dominant feature, of the locality.

74. The noise of motor sports emanating from the Track and the Stadium are an established part of the character of the locality. They cannot be left out of account when considering whether the matters of which the claimants complain constitute a nuisance.

75. I quite accept that if the second and third defendants had ignored the breach of condition notices and had conducted their business at noise levels above those permitted by the planning permissions, the claimants might have been able to make out a case in nuisance. It appears, however, that this was not the case. Abatement works were carried out in 2008 to the satisfaction of Forest Heath District Council. No breach of condition notices have been served since then, apart from one which did not relate to noise level.”

The cases on which Jackson L.J. based his four propositions are something of a mixed bag. In the first, *Gillingham BC v Medway (Chatham Docks) Co Ltd*\(^{141}\) the dock company obtained planning permission to develop a commercial port on part of the site of the former Chatham Dockyard. The council, having granted planning permission for that development, then contended that heavy goods vehicles travelling to or from the port at night constituted a public nuisance. Buckley J. noted that planning permission differed from statutory authority, and analysed the interplay between planning permission and the law of nuisance as follows:\(^ {142}\)

“Parliament has set up a statutory framework and delegated the task of balancing the interests of the community against those of individuals and of holding the scales between individuals, to the local planning authority. There is the right to object to any proposed grant, provision for appeals and inquiries, and ultimately the minister decides. There is the added safeguard of judicial review. If a planning authority grants permission for a particular construction or use in its area it is almost certain that some local inhabitants will be prejudiced in the quiet enjoyment of their properties. Can they defeat the scheme simply by bringing an action in nuisance? If not, why not? It has been said, no doubt correctly, that planning permission is not a licence to commit nuisance and that a planning authority has no jurisdiction to authorise nuisance. However, a planning authority can, through its development plans and decisions, alter the character of a neighbourhood. That may have the effect of rendering innocent activities which prior to the change would have been an actionable nuisance.”

Buckley J. held that the grant of planning permission and the construction of the port had changed the character of the neighbourhood and that it would be unrealistic to operate the port without causing the disturbances of which the local residents complained. In *Coventry*, Jackson L.J. agreed:

“Harsh though that outcome may seem, I respectfully agree both with the decision and with the reasoning on which it is based. The planning authority had made a decision in the public interest and the consequences had to be accepted.”

In the next case, *Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd*,\(^ {143}\) smells from the defendant’s pig farm were held to constitute a private nuisance. One of the issues concerned the effect of planning permissions which the defendants had obtained for this development. The Court of Appeal held that this did not constitute a defence to the plaintiff’s claim in nuisance. The court distinguished *Gillingham* on the basis that the grant of planning permission for “a change of use of a very small piece of land” had not changed the character of the neighbourhood. Jackson L.J. saw this analysis as “readily comprehensible” and as giving rise to no inconsistency with the decision in *Gillingham*. It is a curious case, where planning permissions for buildings

\(^{141}\) *Gillingham BC v Medway (Chatham Docks) Co Ltd* [1993] Q.B. 343.
\(^{142}\) *Gillingham BC v Medway (Chatham Docks) Co Ltd* [1993] Q.B. 343 at 359F–H.
\(^{143}\) *Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd* [1996] Ch. 19.
housing some 400 pigs were granted, the pig houses being only 11 metres away from the nearest part of the claimant’s residential property, as compared with the recommended separation distances in the United Kingdom and elsewhere of between 100–700m.  

Thirdly, there was the House of Lords’ decision in *Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd*,[145] in which residents in the London Docklands area complained that the large building constructed by the defendants interfered with the reception of television broadcasts. The House of Lords held that the plaintiffs could not maintain a claim in nuisance. The defendants had constructed their building in accordance with the planning permission which had been granted. The defendants could not be held liable in private nuisance for the simple consequences of their building being present. Lord Hoffmann noted that since 1947 planning legislation has drastically curtailed the freedom of an owner to build as he chooses on his land and then added:  

“In a case such as this, where the development is likely to have an impact upon many people over a large area, the planning system is, I think, a far more appropriate form of control, from the point of view of both the developer and the public, than enlarging the right to bring actions for nuisance at common law. It enables the issues to be debated before an expert forum at a planning inquiry and gives the developer the advantage of certainty as to what he is entitled to build.”

Lord Hoffmann also added the important qualification that the grant of planning permission does not constitute a defence to anything that is a nuisance under the existing law.[147] Lord Cooke of Thorndon, who dissented in the result, observed that planning measures denoted a standard of what is acceptable in the community” with the consequence that failure to comply with restrictions imposed by the planning system would mean that the defendant’s use of their land was unreasonable. He accepted that compliance with planning controls was not in itself a defence to a nuisance action, as illustrated by the decision in *Wheeler*. He added that *Wheeler* was “… an instance of an injudicious grant of planning consent, procured apparently by the supply of inaccurate and incomplete information”. On the other hand, he regarded it as of “major importance” that Canary Wharf had been built in an enterprise zone under special legislation designed to encourage regeneration.  

*Hunter v Canary Wharf* and *Wheeler v Saunders* are of course extremely different cases on their facts and context. The Canary Wharf development was undertaken pursuant to the statutory scheme in ss.134–136 of the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980, the London Docklands Development Corporation Orders and the Isle of Dogs Enterprise Zone Order, and to enterprise zone consents issued by the London Docklands Development Corporation. Even so, the powers under which the development was authorised did not in themselves provide immunity from nuisance. The case turned on the question of whether the common law should restrict the individual’s right to build on their land, even if the presence of the building had effects on others such as interference with TV reception (absent any easement)—to which the majority answer was that it should not interfere.[151] The issue of character of the neighbourhood did not arise for decision, since the case was decided on a number of preliminary issues.[152] As Lord Hoffmann made clear, this was major development to meet a key policy objective of regeneration in the national interest, and

---

144 See the expert evidence summarised by Staughton L.J. in *Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd* [1996] Ch. 19 at 27C–F.
146 *Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd* [1997] A.C. 655 at 710A–C.
147 *Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd* [1997] A.C. 655 at 710D.
149 *Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd* [1997] A.C. 655 at 722A.
151 Lord Cooke of Thorndon dissenting.
152 See per Pill L.J. in *Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd* [1997] A.C. 655 at 669H, commenting, however, that the evidence did not suggest that the neighbourhood would continue to have anything other than a substantial TV-watching residential component. Lord Cooke did however regard the development as having changed the character of the neighbourhood by which the standard of reasonable user fell to be judged (722G).
was not subject to the normal requirements of a public inquiry.\textsuperscript{153} The fact that the normal planning law safeguards for affected local residents had been curtailed did not in Lord Hoffmann’s view justify changing the basic principles of the law of nuisance, under which the local residents had no remedy.

A fourth case, \textit{Watson v Croft Promo-Sport Ltd.},\textsuperscript{154} is also relevant. It was dealt with briefly by Jackson L.J. in \textit{Coventry} as simply an example of the application of established principles to particular facts, but in fact the judgment of the Court of Appeal contains some further helpful discussion. Planning permission had been granted in 1963 for use of a WWII aerodrome for motor sport events. In 1998, in the context of a further planning inquiry into deemed refusal for variation of conditions, the owner had entered into a s.106 undertaking agreeing to ensure that no vehicle using the circuit should exceed certain maximum noise levels and that the use of the circuit for motor and motor cycle events should be limited by reference to noise levels measured at a defined point on the circuit. The inspector had allowed the appeal and granted permission for continued use free of the relevant 1963 conditions but subject to those in the s.106 undertaking. This was on the basis that the site enjoyed almost unrestricted rights to use the circuit for motor racing with unsilenced vehicles every day of the year, and that the s.106 restrictions represented a reasonable compromise.

On appeal against an award of damages to the claimants for private nuisance it was argued by the defendant that in the case of those planning decisions which may properly be regarded as “strategic planning decisions affected by considerations of public interest”, the grant of planning permission \textit{of itself} affects the private rights of the citizen to complain of a common law nuisance. The Court of Appeal rejected that submission. There is no category of “strategic” planning permission which can, simply by virtue of being granted, affect common law rights, but that even if there were such a category, the permissions in this case would not fall within it as put by Sir Andrew Morritt, Chancellor:

\begin{quote}
33. “In the light of these two well established principles I find it hard to understand how there can be some middle category of planning permission which, without implementation, is capable of affecting private rights unless such effect is specifically authorised by Parliament. It has not been suggested to us that there is any section in the statutory code governing the application for and grant of planning permission which could have that result. For that reason alone I would reject the second ground of appeal put forward by the defendants.

34. In any event, even if there be some middle category such as that for which the defendants contend neither of the grants of planning permission on which the defendants rely can be properly described as ‘strategic’. The 1963 grant was specific to the part of the airfield to which it applied. It dealt with the issue of noise, but in a more confined context than what might reasonably be described as ‘strategic’. In the case of the 1998 grant it is plain from the passages in the inspector’s report to which I have drawn attention that the purpose and effect of that grant was to introduce some restriction and control over the otherwise unrestricted activities authorised by the 1963 grant. In effect it dealt with the unimplemented parts of the 1963 grant. It follows that, on the facts of this case, neither grant of permission can come within any such third category.”
\end{quote}

That being the case, there was no basis to interfere with the conclusion of the first instance judge, Simon J., that implementation of the 1963 and 1998 permissions had brought about a change in the nature and character of the essentially rural area. The judge’s conclusions on this point are worth setting out:\textsuperscript{155}

\begin{quote}
54. “I accept that the 1998 decision was robust in the sense that it was based on a full and thorough Inquiry; and the Defendant may be right to say that there could not have been a
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd} [1997] A.C. 655 at 701A–C and 710F.
better forum for a consideration as to what the nature and character of the area should be. However, I do not accept that there was a decision as to the nature and character of the area, which defeats the present claim. It is clear that the Inspector regarded the 1963 planning permission as providing the developer with a very wide consent; and the s.106 Agreement as a protection against what he otherwise described … as ‘the almost unrestricted rights which the operators now enjoy to operate the circuit’. The decision cannot properly be regarded as a strategic decision affected by considerations of public interest. The Inspector considered that some controls were better than none; and it was only to that extent that a public interest arose.

55. The Defendant is correct in saying that the noise from racing has occurred for forty years; but I do not accept that the character of the neighbourhood has been changed. From 1949 to 1994 the character and nature of the locality was essentially rural, but with the use of the former airfield for a limited number (no more than 20) of races each year. It is clear that the circuit could be, and was, run in a way that was consistent with its essentially rural nature. That essential character did not change, despite the gradual development of the Circuit with an intensification of the level of noise.

56. It is clear from the planning process leading up to the 1998 decision that it was the Defendant which was dictating what would and would not take place (including the noise levels) at the Circuit. It seems to me that in such circumstances it is difficult to treat the 1998 decision as ‘a far more appropriate form of control, from the point of view of both the developer and the public’, to use the phrase of Lord Hoffman.

57. I do not accept the Defendant’s contention that it is ‘wrong and contrary to public policy for a common law Court to travel over the same ground and to come up with an inconsistent conclusion.’ It seems to me that this submission comes close to a contention that the planning permission is determinative of the issue of private nuisance in a case such as this. There may be sound arguments in favour of such a contention; but it does not represent the present state of the law. What is essentially an administrative decision does not extinguish private rights without compensation.”

It is difficult not to conclude that there is an element of confusion running through the cases as to the effect of planning permission. It may be that this will be resolved by the Supreme Court, which has given permission to appeal against the Court of Appeal judgment in Coventry v Lawrence. It seems clear that, as the law stands, the grant of planning permission does not in itself provide a defence to an action in nuisance. In other words, the fact that a local planning authority has decided to permit a landfill site to be located within smelling distance of housing does not avail the landfill operator if the smells emitted are unreasonable in terms of their effects.

However, implementation of a planning permission may lead to a change in the character of the locality, which may in turn affect the standard of comfort which a resident can reasonably expect. One would not normally expect a single development to have that effect except in the most extreme cases. The introduction of a new source of noise or odour should not itself change the character of the locality, as otherwise the perpetrator of the nuisance would be legitimising their own unlawful conduct. But if numerous sources of noise and odour are introduced then there must come a point at which the character of the locality has changed. It should logically make no difference whether or not these have been subject to planning permission—what matters is the factual question of the change which has come about.

If the grant and subsequent implementation of a single planning permission could in general bring about a change in the character of the locality, and hence affect private rights, then it could be said with force

156 Indeed, were that the case, the law of nuisance would be left with an extremely limited role: see J. Steele and T. Jewell, “Nuisance and Planning” [1993] 56 Modern Law Review 568.
that local planning authorities would have to take that into account as a material consideration, leading
them into territory which previously they have in general avoided. Plainly one would not expect a local
planning authority, acting reasonably, to grant planning permission for a development (a composting
facility for example) where it is clear that nuisance to existing neighbours will inevitably be the result.
The LPA’s view may well be that, the plant being properly operated and well-regulated, there should not
be a nuisance. However, that assumption may turn out to have been mistaken once operation begins. In
that case the law of nuisance provides important safeguards for local residents, and it should not follow
that the residents will simply have to put up with whatever smells or noise emanate from the plant.

Equally of course planning permission may be granted for residential development in an established
industrial area. In the same way, it should not be the case that the mere grant of permission would entitle
the incoming resident to expect higher standards of comfort than would be the case in a basically industrial
area. It is trite law that “coming to the nuisance is no defence”\textsuperscript{157}: it makes no difference “whether the man
went to the nuisance or the nuisance to the man.”\textsuperscript{158} It is a sound rule, in that it should not be for one
landowner, simply because he is first in the field, to determine unilaterally the character of the
neighbourhood and the viability of using nearby land\textsuperscript{159}; however it may have harsh consequences in
individual cases. The locality principle is a key way in which the potentially harsh consequences of that
rule are mitigated in practice.\textsuperscript{160}

A somewhat different question arises where the planning permission purports to lay down standards
for noise and other environmental effects. Does keeping within the terms of these restrictions provide a
defence to nuisance? In other words is it presumptively the case that the standards set by the planning
authority represent the level of comfort which a residential occupier can reasonably expect? Do these
standards have a potential role in setting any threshold for what amounts to a nuisance, whether in terms
of intensity (decibel levels), frequency (the number of “events” allowed per year) or duration (operating
hours)?

Breach of a planning requirement of this sort will not of course of itself mean that there is a claim in
nuisance, unless there is actual interference at an unreasonable level with the claimant’s enjoyment
of their land. This will involve looking at all the relevant factors, of which the planning requirements will
be one. There is certainly some suggestion in the judicial pronouncements of Jackson L.J. in Coventry
(see above) and Carnwath L.J. in Barr v Biffa (see below) that exceeding limits set in a planning permission
might make the interference unreasonable.\textsuperscript{161} Equally, Jackson L.J. in Coventry appeared to find it relevant
that the defendant had conducted itself in accordance with the permissions and that there had been no
abatement or enforcement action by the local authority.

It is suggested that this is an area which does not lend itself to clear cut, black and white rules. The
parameters set by a local planning authority or inspector on appeal may or may not be a suitable yardstick
for the court in seeking to find the reasonable level of enjoyment protected in any given case by the tort
of nuisance. Such parameters can never, it is suggested, be fully decisive, in that the court cannot yield
its own exercise of judgment in an individual case to a planning authority which has made a decision in
the wider public interest. The planning parameters should not at the same time be entirely irrelevant. It
will be for the court to decide what weight to give them. This will involve a degree of interrogation of the
decision-making process which led to the parameters to ascertain their strength in the context of the
question which the court has to answer. In a recent article in the Modern Law Review, Maria Lee visits
the same question when considering the relationship between the standard of care applied in personal

\textsuperscript{157} See e.g. Bliss v Hall 132 E.R. 758; (1838) 4 Bing. N.C. 183; Miller v Jackson [1977] Q.B. 966.
\textsuperscript{158} Fleming v Hislop (1886) L.R. 11 App. Cas. 686; (1886) 13 R. (H.L.) 43 at 697 per Lord Halsbury.
\textsuperscript{160} See John Murphy, The Law of Nuisance (Oxford, 2010), para.5.16.
\textsuperscript{161} See Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence [2012] EWCA Civ 26 at [75] and Barr v Biffa Waste Services [2012] EWCA Civ 312 at [75].
injury cases and regulatory standards.\textsuperscript{162} The abstract to her article puts it as follows from which the possible parallels with the nuisance/planning situation can be seen:\textsuperscript{163}

“The relationship between tort and regulation is dense and complicated. This paper examines diverse approaches to one small element of this relationship: the relationship between regulatory norms and the standard of care in personal injury cases. The lack of clear rules governing that interaction is not surprising: we would never expect the courts to give up the authority (or abdicate the responsibility) to generate private law norms; on the other hand, nor would we expect them to ignore the potential authority and legitimacy of external norms. The strength of external standards is best identified by close scrutiny of the regulation itself. The varying authority of external norms in a private law forum requires engagement with the process by which the external norms were reached. Who and what determined the ‘ought’ of regulation will provide greater insight into the ways in which it should inform the ‘ought’ of tort.”

In applying this possibly very helpful approach to nuisance some caution is of course needed.\textsuperscript{164} Regulatory norms set in the context of avoiding the risk of injury to employees (for example) may be a very different animal to conditions set as part of the process of consenting a project. Care is needed to see what scenarios were examined and what representations were made and how they were addressed. Simply to argue that the conditions represent a balance of public and private interests and that such a balance should apply in all future circumstances may be far too simplistic. Indeed, social utility or public interest are not recognised defences in private nuisance. The courts are in general not inclined to engage in “utilitarian balancing of general good against individual risk”.\textsuperscript{165}

To conclude it may be helpful to consider two particular case studies which are highly topical in illustrating the relationship between the planning system and the private law of nuisance. These concern wind farm noise and landfill odours.

\textit{Case study: Wind farm noise}

There are certain areas which seem to present particular problems. One is wind farm noise. This led DEFRA to commission a research project which considered the use of statutory nuisance abatement powers to deal with noise nuisances from wind farms.\textsuperscript{166} It concluded that planning and statutory nuisance regimes work separately and are not a substitute for each other; further that while compliance with planning conditions may prevent statutory nuisance occurring, it does not provide an automatic defence against the normal test for a statutory nuisance. Planning conditions dealing with noise and amplitude modulation from wind farms have themselves proved difficult to interpret and apply, as in \textit{Hulme v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government}, where the Court of Appeal was willing to imply words into what would otherwise have been a defective condition in order to make it workable.\textsuperscript{167}

The United Kingdom’s first commercial wind farm was built in Delabole in North Cornwall. Its ten 400kw turbines became operational in 1991. Planning permission was granted without appeal. A great deal has changed since 1991. The first change is the scale of the industry, encouraged as part of the


\textsuperscript{163} See https://iris.ucl.ac.uk/research/browse/show-publication?pub_id=332691&source_id=3 [Accessed October 1, 2012].

\textsuperscript{164} One example of where it has been applied is in respect of the defence of prescription, where it has been said that the prescriptive right will only extend to carrying on the business in the best practicable way, according to standards applying at the time the nuisance was alleged to have been created: see \textit{Shoreham-By-Sea UDC v Dolphin Canadian Proteins Ltd} [1972] L.G.R. 261 at 267 per Donaldson J.

\textsuperscript{165} See \textit{Transco Plc v Stockport MBC} [2003] UKHL 61; [2004] 2 A.C. 1 at [105] per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe.


\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Hulme v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government} [2011] EWCA Civ 638 (though the case can also be seen as a matter of construction based on the language of the conditions rather than implication (and as such not on all fours with the traditional approach in \textit{Trustees of Walton on Thames Charities v Walton and Weighbridge DC} [1970] 21 P.M.C.R. 411). For a further recent planning decision on the issue of wind farm noise see \textit{Lee v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government} [2011] EWHC 807 (Admin).
Government’s policy on renewables, discussed above. What this means in practice is that schemes are no longer mainly located in relatively remote mountains and moors, but often exist in close proximity to housing.

The second change is the scale of the technology. Early wind farms used turbines with an installed capacity of 250–400kW, and an overall height of around 55m. Today, applications commonly specify 3MW machines and the typical turbine has grown to more than 150m. Although the size and capacity has increased, the rotational speed of the turbine blades has declined. The blades of a 250kW machine may rotate at up to 30rpm; those of a 3MW turbine do not rotate at more than 18–20rpm. The combination of greater turbine height and flatter topography as locations have moved from the hillier areas of Wales and the South West into the flatter terrain of Eastern England has implications for the type of noise which may be generated, in particular aerodynamic modulation.

The third change is the scale of the opposition. There are more than 200 anti-wind farm groups in the United Kingdom; opposition is dedicated, organised, and has been shown to inhibit the likelihood and speed with which planning permission is obtained. The list of objections can be long. It will depend, of course, on the circumstances of each site. The visual impact of the turbines on the surrounding landscape is a perennial ground of challenge. Now almost as commonplace, and more controversial, are objections on the basis of noise.

The guidance in PPS22 stated that ETSU-R-97 *The Assessment & Rating of Noise from Wind Farms*, a 1996 paper of the Noise Working Group of the Energy Technology Support Unit for the DTI, is the way in which wind farm noise should be assessed and rated. This recommends the taking of baseline noise measurements under a variety of wind conditions to derive the “prevailing background noise level” from which noise limits are calculated, allowing for example night-time noise limits of 43dB $L_{A90}$ or 5dB above the prevailing background level, whichever is higher. ETSU has a variety of critics. It has been said that it bears no resemblance to standards for other industrial noise sources and can allow very significant noise impacts at certain properties particularly where background noise levels are low. This perhaps is not surprising given that ETSU seeks to strike a balance between noise impacts and the need for renewable energy. As Elias L.J. commented in one case:

“...The ETSU standard, as with most guidelines, recognises that a balance has to be struck between the public interest in the development and the interference with private rights. It assists an inspector in determining how that balance should be struck so far as noise is concerned. It does not, of course, mean that individuals will not be adversely prejudiced even by noise levels which fall below the maximum indicated in the ETSU guidelines, but they will generally have to put up with that noise in the wider public interest.”

It has been said that the guidance has not kept pace with the technology, and that ETSU should be reformed or replaced to take account of modern machines and different kinds of noise. At the very least, ETSU is not always an easy document to understand and to implement. As evidenced by the cases, this difficulty often forms the basis of challenges in planning appeals, and in the higher courts. On July 27,
2010, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change was asked in Parliament whether ETSU would be reviewed. The answer was negative:

“Noise is a key issue to be taken into account in considering proposals for wind farm development. There is no reason to believe that the protection from noise provided for by the ETSU-R-97 guidance does not remain acceptable, and we have no plans to change this. However, I have commissioned an analysis of how noise impacts are considered in the determination of wind farm planning applications in England. The project will seek to establish best practice in assessing and rating wind turbine noise by investigating previous decisions. Our aim is to ensure that ETSU-R-97 is applied in a consistent and effective manner and that it is implemented in a way that provides the intended level of protection.”

The report reviewing how ETSU-R-97 is applied was published in April 2011. It considered and reviewed some 46 noise assessments undertaken for wind farms. It identified a number of issues and inconsistencies in approach, perhaps the most important of which were the approach to cumulative assessment, the lack of any agreed methodology for noise prediction and modelling, assumptions and corrections as to wind shear effects, the possible inconsistency of the night-time limits with the most recent WHO positions on noise at night, and potential for modulation of aerodynamic noise (blade swish)—the latter being the subject of further assessment work commissioned by Renewable UK. Despite this, the Report found that the ETSU-R-97 methodology had been universally employed.

However, noise will undoubtedly continue to be a concern for proposals of this sort, in rural communities which may have benefited traditionally from low levels of background noise. As Sedley L.J. put it in his judgment in the decision in R. (on the application of Enstone Uplands and District Conservation Trust) v West Oxfordshire DC:

“Noise is a plague which can wreck communities and ruin lives, and planning authorities are not only entitled but bound to take very seriously any land use or proposed land use which is going to add to the burden of noise to which communities, and none more than rural communities, are subjected.”

With that in mind, it is unfortunate that there is so much in the relevant law and practice which remains unclear. As Deputy High Court Judge George Bartlett QC put it in the Barnes case, at [44]:

“I would only add that it seems to me most unfortunate that after many years of wind farm developments there are no generic noise conditions, contained in national planning guidance, for local planning authorities and inspectors to impose. The result is that resources have to be spent by developers, local planning authorities and objectors in agreeing, or disputing, what the noise conditions should contain; and, on appeal, inspectors have to devote time at the inquiry and afterwards in resolving the matter. And then there can be challenges to the conditions that are imposed, as has happened here. Unsurprisingly appeal decisions come up with different answers, as I was shown, and the scope that there is for inconsistency in this respect is obviously undesirable.”

The first civil noise nuisance claim against a wind farm developer was heard in 2011. The case was Davis v Tinsley, Watts, Fenland Windfarms Ltd, EDF and Fenland Green Power Co-op Ltd. Jane Davis—a veteran wind-farm objector—lived about 1,000m from an 8-turbine wind farm in Deeping St. Nicholas,


174 R. (on the application of Enstone Uplands and District Conservation Trust) v West Oxfordshire DC [2009] EWCA Civ 1555 at [44].


Lincolnshire. The Particulars of Claim described “swishing, ripping/flashing, low frequency humming, mechanical turning, background roar, ‘helicopter noise’ (aerodynamic modulation) and enhanced ‘helicopter noise’ (amplitude modulation of aerodynamic modulation)”. However, it was agreed that the turbines were ETSU-compliant. Nonetheless, their operation was said in the particulars of claim to give rise to an inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary comfort and enjoyment by the claimants of their home and garden. The claimants had complained that there was a statutory nuisance, but in the opinion of the local environmental health officers this was not the case. Part of the defendants’ case was that the wind farm’s compliance with PPS22, PPG24 and ETSU-R-97 is evidence that it does not constitute a nuisance, and further that the support for wind farms in UK energy policy is relevant in determining “reasonableness” for the purposes of a nuisance action. The case settled on confidential terms and has been the subject of markedly differing commentary by leading counsel for the defendant and solicitors for the claimant.

Some areas of the country, for example Lincolnshire, are disproportionately affected by very large numbers of wind farm applications. Inevitably, this provokes a reaction. The Wind Turbines (Minimum Distances from Residential Premises) Bill, introduced by Lord Reay, received its first reading in the Lords in May 2012. It seeks to preclude any relevant authority granting planning permission or development consent for a wind turbine unless it meets the required minimum separation distances from residential premises, including farmhouses. For the smallest turbines the distance would be 1,000m, rising to 3,000m for wind turbines greater than 150m in height. A similar bill ran out of time in the last Parliamentary Session, following a second reading debate on June 10, 2011 in which it attracted considerable support. Centrally imposed prescriptive distances would however be counter to the Government’s localism and decentralisation agenda, as pointed out by Baroness Hanham for the Government. There is however some central guidance. The Companion Guide to PPS22 suggests a practical separation distance of 350m based on noise impacts, Scottish guidance suggests distances of up to 2km between areas of search and the edge of settlements to reduce visual impact, and in Wales 500m is considered a typical separation distance to avoid unacceptable noise impacts.

At the more local level, Lincolnshire CC has announced its intention to apply minimum separation distances of 2km unless it can be demonstrated that noise levels would be acceptable. The County Council is of course not the planning authority and it is difficult to see what weight this statement could properly carry. Meanwhile, the separation distances introduced by Milton Keynes Council look to be subject to possible legal challenge as contrary to national policy by RWE npower.

It has been noted that in Denmark, Germany and Spain, large increases in numbers of wind farms have proved to be relatively uncontroversial, possibly because programmes of community benefits are built into the fabric of the process, taking the form of local tax payments, jobs and economic benefits and

\*178 HL Bill 11.
\*180 Hansard HL, col.488ff.
\*181 Hansard HL, col.513.
\*182 Scottish Planning Policy 2010 para.190.
opportunities for community ownership.\textsuperscript{186} How far such an approach would be acceptable in the UK legal and social context is debatable.\textsuperscript{187}

**Case study: Landfill odours**

One side effect of the requirement to pre-treat domestic waste before it goes to landfill is that landfills have potentially become smellier. Waste remains for longer in the materials recycling facility while the recyclable fractions are removed and sorted, and the proportion of bio-active material is higher. This can present unwelcome effects for communities living close to landfill sites. Such was the case for residents living near the Westmill 2 site operated by Biffa Waste Services near Ware, Hertfordshire. Residents complained of offensive odours which prevented enjoyment of their gardens, caused them to keep windows closed and prevented them drying washing outdoors. They brought a group action in private nuisance in the case of *Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd*.\textsuperscript{188}

At first instance, following a long trial in the Technology and Construction Court, Coulson J. held that the private law and environmental law should march in step, in that if EU law demanded pre-treatment facilities, which are subject to detailed control under the environmental permitting regime, then there should be no right to claim in nuisance unless there was some negligence or default in complying with its permit by the operator.\textsuperscript{189} This would have been a major development in the law of nuisance, but the Court of Appeal disagreed. The Supreme Court on July 26, 2012 refused permission to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision on the basis that the application did not raise an arguable point of law.

In the Court of Appeal, Carnwath L.J. (as he then was) put the matter pithily:

45. “The following are the main building blocks of the judge’s reasoning:

i) The ‘controlling principle’ of the modern law of nuisance is that of ‘reasonable user’. If the user is reasonable, then absent proof of negligence, the claim must fail.

ii) In the context of the modern system of regulatory controls under EU and domestic environmental legislation, and the specific waste permit granted in 2003, the common law must be adapted to ‘march in step with’ the legislation. Biffa’s user must be deemed to have been reasonable, if it complied with the terms of the permit (para 350).

iii) Furthermore, the permit was relevant in two other ways:

a) The grant of a permit for what was the first site for tipping of pre-treated waste was “strategic” in nature, and therefore altered the character of the neighbourhood in which reasonableness was to be judged.

b) The permit (in particular condition 2.6.12) by implication gave statutory licence for “inevitable teething troubles”; and for escape of “a certain amount of odour emission”, which was “inevitable”, and “inherent” in the granting of the permit and the underlying statutory scheme.

iv) It followed that in the absence of any specific allegation of negligence or breach of the permit, Biffa’s user must be deemed reasonable, and the claims must fail.

v) In any event, in the light of recent authorities, and since some level of odour was inherent in the permitted activity and accepted by residents, it was necessary to set a precise “threshold”, to distinguish between the acceptable and the unacceptable.


\textsuperscript{188} *Barr v Biffa Waste Services* [2012] EWCA Civ 312.

\textsuperscript{189} *Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd* [2011] EWHC 1003 (TCC).
vi) In the absence of any alternative suggestion by the claimants, the judge set the threshold at “one odour complaint day each week (i.e. 52 each year) regardless of intensity, duration, and locality”. Judged by that test all but two of the claims would have failed.

46. In my view there are short answers to all these points:
i) ‘Reasonable user’ is at most a different way of describing old principles, not an excuse for reinventing them.

ii) The common law of nuisance has co-existed with statutory controls, albeit less sophisticated, since the 19th century. There is no principle that the common law should ‘march with’ a statutory scheme covering similar subject-matter. Short of express or implied statutory authority to commit a nuisance (rule (v) above), there is no basis, in principle or authority, for using such a statutory scheme to cut down private law rights.

iii) Further:
   a) The 2003 permit was not ‘strategic’ in nature, nor did it change the essential ‘character’ of the neighbourhood, which had long included tipping. The only change was the introduction of a more offensive form of waste, producing a new type of smell emission.
   
   b) The permit did not, and did not purport to, authorise the emission of such smells. Far from being anticipated and impliedly authorised, the problem was not covered by the original Waste Management Plan, and the effects of the change seem to have come as a surprise to both Biffa and the Environment Agency. Nor can they be dismissed as mere “teething troubles”, since they continued intermittently without a permanent solution for five years.

iv) There was no requirement for the claimants to allege or prove negligence or breach of condition. Even if compliance with a statutory permit is capable of being a relevant factor, it would be for the defendant to prove compliance, not the other way round.

v) There is no general rule requiring or justifying the setting of a threshold in nuisance cases. The two cases mentioned do not support such a general rule, and in any event concerned noisy activities which could readily be limited to specific days (unlike smelly tipping at Westmill).

vi) By adopting such a threshold, the judge deprived at least some of the claimants of their right to have their individual cases assessed on their merits.”

At [75] and following, Carnwath L.J. discussed the question of the relevance of planning permission. The judge had concluded that the fact that the site had planning permission did not help Biffa, but the fact that it had an environmental permit for landfill did, and that the grant of the permit was “clearly strategic”. Carnwath L.J. disagreed:

“I am unable to agree with this interpretation, either in principle or on the facts of this case. This does not mean that the terms of any permission or permit are irrelevant. An activity which is conducted in contravention of planning or environmental controls is unlikely to be reasonable. But the converse does not follow. Sticking to the rules is an aspect of good neighbourliness, but it is far from the whole story - in law as in life.”
Carnwath L.J. also referred to the 2009 Court of Appeal decision in *Watson v Croft Promo-Sport* (mentioned above) and the Chancellor’s summary in that case of the effect of earlier authorities:

“First, it is well established that the grant of planning permission as such does not affect the private law rights of third parties … Second, the implementation of that planning permission may so alter the nature and character of the locality as to shift the standard of reasonable user which governs the question of nuisance or not…”

In the light of these well established principles Carnwath L.J. found it hard to understand how there can be some middle category of planning permission which, without implementation, is capable of affecting private rights unless such effect is specifically authorised by Parliament. Carnwath L.J. also referred to the word “strategic” as used in some of the cases, noting that it came from an obiter dictum of Staughton L.J. in *Wheeler v Saunders* where he said:

“It is not a *strategic planning decision* affected by considerations of public interest. Unless one is prepared to accept that any planning decision authorises any nuisance which must inevitably come from it, the argument that the nuisance was authorised by planning permission in this case must fail. I am not prepared to accept that premise. It may be—I express no concluded opinion—that some planning decisions will authorise some nuisances. But that is as far as I am prepared to go …”

Carnwath L.J. noted that although the other members of the Court of Appeal in *Wheeler* agreed in general, they did not in terms adopt that formulation. Peter Gibson L.J., commenting on the *Gillingham* case, said:

“Prior to the *Gillingham* case the general assumption appears to have been that private rights to claim in nuisance were unaffected by the permissive grant of planning permission, the developer going ahead with the development at his own risk if his activities were to cause a nuisance. The *Gillingham* case, if rightly decided, calls that assumption into question, at any rate in cases, like *Gillingham* itself, of a major development altering the character of a neighbourhood with wide consequential effects such as required a balancing of competing public and private interests before permission was granted. I can well see that in such a case the public interest must be allowed to prevail and that it would be inappropriate to grant an injunction (though whether that should preclude any award of damages in lieu is a question which may need further consideration). But I am not prepared to accept that the principle applied in the *Gillingham* case must be taken to apply to every planning decision. The Court should be slow to acquiesce in the extinction of private rights without compensation as a result of administrative decisions which cannot be appealed and are difficult to challenge.”

In any event, Carnwath L.J. could not see how this line of authority assisted Biffa. He noted that the scope of the “*Gillingham Docks* exception” remains unsettled and is a matter of continuing debate among environmental layers. But whatever its true scope, it had no relevance in this case:

“Contrary to the suggestion in the passage of the judgment … there was no evidence of a pre-determined ‘strategy’ of the Environment Agency, let alone the planning authority, to transform this area into one for the tipping of pre-treated waste. Had any such strategy been proposed, and had the possible consequences been explained, one would have expected there to have been consultation followed by strong objections. In any event, there is no authority for extending such principles to a waste permit granted by the Environment Agency, not the planning authority; and for purposes

---


191 *Barr v Biffa Waste Services* [2012] EWCA Civ 312 at [30], emphasis added by Carnwath L.J.

192 *Barr v Biffa Waste Services* [2012] EWCA Civ 312 at 35E–G, emphasis again added by Carnwath L.J.

concerned, not with the balance of uses in the neighbourhood (which remained unchanged), but with the regulation of one particular activity within it.”

Carnwath L.J. likewise regarded the decision of the Court of Appeal in *Coventry* as of little assistance in this case:

“Although we invited the parties’ comments on this judgment, they do not affect my view of the issues in the present case. The judgment of Jackson LJ adds additional authority to the *Gillingham Docks* approach. It is also of interest that he appears to have seen the question of ‘change of character’ as raising a simple question of fact, rather than one limited by epithets such as ‘strategic’. However, I agree with Mr Tromans’ submission that there is no parallel between the permissions in that case, granted some years before, and the waste permit in this case. The more direct analogy here would be with the various permissions, granted over a long period for quarrying and tipping as well as housing, the implementation of which has created the character of the neighbourhood as it now is. As Mr Tromans points out, there was no detailed consultation on the likely adverse implications of the permit in terms of odour, nor any balancing of the conflicting interests of the residents and the public interest in landflling. In my view, the case gives no support to the proposition that a relevant change in character was effected by the grant of the 2003 waste permit.”

Arguments in nuisance cases tend to follow a well-trodden path: there are arguments that the claimant is exaggerating, or is unduly sensitive, or that their credibility is undermined by the failure to keep written records of incidents of the nuisance, or to make contemporaneous complaints. The judgment of Veale J. in the 1960s case of *Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd* presents a refreshingly down-to-earth approach to these matters—for example he commented that:

“… neither the plaintiff nor his wife before the action had made a specific complaint of smell; but they had in my judgment many matters of which they were entitled to complain.”

*Barr v Biffa* at one level can be seen as a return to the basic values of nuisance law; a reaction against sophisticated arguments which seek to reach some accommodation between modern forms of regulation and the traditional “reasonableness” based approach of nuisance. Keeping within the regulatory rules may be a prerequisite of good neighbourliness, but as Carnwath L.J. stressed, it does not provide any guarantee of immunity if the effect of keeping within those rules is unreasonable interference with one’s neighbours.

**Overall conclusions**

If planning decisions are to have the effect of restricting or curtailing rights which people would otherwise have at common law, then that raises squarely a number of issues. The first is what procedures exist to ensure that those affected are made aware of and can effectively participate in the decision making process. There are plainly serious problems here.

**Procedural issues**

First, as has been recently pointed out in an article in the Journal of Planning Law, the procedures and practices under the Development Management Procedure Order 2010 art.13 for notifying local residents of projects (in that case a 112 foot turbine which would be seen from 5 miles in all directions and where only 14 local residents were notified) are unsatisfactory and unpredictable. The courts have not in general

---

shown willing to find general duties exist to notify neighbours of proposed development, as a matter of procedural fairness. 196

Secondly, as anyone who has practised in planning law for any length of time knows, the planning system is currently at a low ebb in facilitating effective public participation, the reasons for this being forcefully articulated by Dr Wendy Le-Las and Emily Shirley in another recent J.P.L. article. 197

Thirdly, procedures adopted with the laudable aim of speeding up decision-making on appeals may result in unfairness to a third party who wishes to oppose development on the grounds of impact on their amenity. The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in R. (on the application of Ashley) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government provides a clear example. 198 Local residents opposed a housing development of 43 units on the ground of noise disturbance that would be caused by use of the proposed parking area. The local planning authority refused permission on that ground and a written representations appeal followed. The local residents were notified of the date by which their final representations were to be received; on that date, without notice being given to the residents, the developer submitted a detailed acoustic technical report. It took a trip to the Court of Appeal to quash the decision resulting from this patently unfair process. The court was less than impressed with the PINS guidance on written representations appeal procedures from the point of view of fairness: 200

“In my view, the Guidance deals less than adequately with the legitimate interests of interested persons in the position of the Association, the appellant and Mr and Mrs Bovey, in circumstances such as the present.”

The test to be applied

Another problem with a planning system which affects private rights through its decisions is what test is applied in the decision making. The question of noise and ETSU-R-97 has been considered above. There is also in the wind farm context the so-called “Lavender Test”, named after the Inspector in the Hempnall wind farm appeal. 201 Here the Inspector said this at para.41 when considering visual amenity:

“The planning system exists to regulate the use and development of land in the public interest. While there is a public interest in avoiding the effects of climate change, for the most part the outlook from private property is a private interest, not a public one. There is, however, a public as well as a private interest in protecting the visual amenity of individual homes where, especially in combination with other impacts such as noise and shadow flicker the presence of wind turbines might be widely regarded as making the property concerned an unattractive (but not necessarily uninhabitable) place in which to live. It is in those terms that I have assessed the effects on visual amenity from neighbouring houses.”

Where a planning authority gets it wrong and finds that permitted development is causing unacceptable effects, one possible remedy is of course a revocation or modification order under Town and Country Planning Act 1990 s.97. However, following the Supreme Court decision in Health and Safety Executive v Wolverhampton CC, 202 in considering the expediency of exercising these powers, the local planning authority is not precluded from taking into account the financial considerations which would follow from having to pay compensation under s.107. Absent rationality challenges for example where serious issues

198 R. (on the application of Ashley) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] EWCA Civ 559.
199 Planning appeals and called-in planning applications (PINS 01/2009).
200 R. (on the application of Ashley) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] EWCA Civ 559 per Pill L.J. at [28].
202 Health and Safety Executive v Wolverhampton CC [2012] UKSC 34.
of public safety are at stake,\(^{203}\) it seems unlikely that s.97 will provide a reliable means of putting right such problems as may stem from planning decisions. The lack of any likely cause of action in tort against the local authority by landowners affected adversely by the grant of planning permission\(^{204}\) makes it all the more unlikely that the authority will contemplate such costly solutions as revocation.

There are also important issues of social justice which arise and which are only just beginning to be grappled with. For example in its excellent report, *Wind Energy and Justice for Disadvantaged Communities*,\(^ {205}\) the Joseph Rowntree Foundation reviews the growing literature on this topic, and points out that provision of benefits to communities affected by development should be a matter of justice, not simply a means of cultivating acceptance and expediting planning permission.\(^ {206}\) It comments that the current long-standing industry benchmark for community benefits of £1000 per MW per annum of installed capacity seems very low. With increasing scale of development and related financial flows may come the opportunity to use benefits over a long period to improve local “resilience”, so as to leave the local community with a more sustainable, locally-embedded energy system, with elements of community ownership, which would retain local employment and generate ongoing funds for community purposes, as opposed to the current position where few jobs are created and of those few will accrue to local residents.

At the end of the day, whilst some dicta in cases loosely talk about nuisance in terms of balancing rights as between the parties, its purpose (unlike the planning system) is not to balance interests in terms of their social, economic or environmental value; it is to protect the reasonable expectations of owners and occupiers of land as to how they should be able to enjoy their land, in their locality.\(^ {207}\) Ultimately, the answer may lie not in denial of a remedy, but in tailoring remedies with a more overt level of discretion based on the public interest, so that socially necessary activities are not prevented altogether but are allowed subject to constraints, or to the payment of compensation. This has been advocated by some academic commentators, including this author,\(^ {208}\) for some years, and appears to be gaining a degree of judicial recognition.\(^ {209}\)

Logically, the fact that even Parliament considers the construction and operation of a project to be in the public interest, whilst it may be a good reason why the courts should not injunct that operation, does not (or should not) affect the principle that costs should be internalised.\(^ {210}\) It is often said that what developers and investors want is certainty that they will be able to operate their facility without facing the threat of an injunction. That is an understandable wish. It should not, however, be translated into carte blanche to avoid the payment of proper compensation where that operation causes unreasonable interference with the amenity of local residents, current or future.

\(^{203}\) *Health and Safety Executive v Wolverhampton CC* [2012] UKSC 34 at [53] per Lord Carnwath.
\(^{206}\) Research shows that—at a broad brush level—disadvantaged communities are less likely to oppose wind development than relatively more advantaged communities, and that many of the areas most affected by such development are characterised by ageing populations, higher than average levels of deprivation, youth outmigration, and reliance on seasonal low-paid employment.
\(^{209}\) *Dennis v Ministry of Defence* [2003] EWHC 793 (QB) at [46]–[48]; [2003] Env. L.R. 34; *Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd* [2012] EWCA Civ 312 at [124].
Community Infrastructure Levy: Will it Deliver?

Tom Dobson

This paper was originally drafted in June 2012. Since then many more local authorities have produced draft charging schedules and there have been additional examinations and examiners’ reports. Furthermore the Department for Communities and Local Government is informally consulting on revisions to the regulations, which may be published prior to the conference. The presentation at the conference will include updates on these matters and the final version of this paper will reflect the position at the end of September 2012.

Summary

Since January 1, 2012 if you wanted to build some new homes in Ilford, Ludlow or Newark you have been required to pay a standard charge to the Council of between £40 and £75 per square metre of private development, equivalent to £3,000–6,000 for an average sized property, for the privilege. By 2014 the majority of Local Authorities across the country are expected to have adopted such charges, some at considerably higher levels, through the implementation of the Community Infrastructure Levy (“CIL”).

Has Government finally, after 60 years, got it right and devised a durable means of capturing some of the benefits of increases in land values for the community, which can be invested in roads, utilities, and schools, to support development? Or will it be added to the list of failed measures in the “Betterment and Compensation” chapter of planning textbooks, brought down by perceived or real impacts on the property market, badly drafted regulations, and political opposition?

Firm evidence is hard to come by. When told of the death of President Coolidge, Dorothy Parker was said to have replied “How could they tell?” A similar comment could be made in relation to anything being said to have a negative impact on the UK property market in its current state. To give some indications this paper reviews the early implementation of CIL against some of the lessons of previous attempts at land value taxation and the stated objectives of the Government in relation to growth and infrastructure planning.

It concludes that by working with the grain of the UK planning system, and because at present it appears to have cross-party (and Treasury) support, CIL probably has better prospects for longevity than previous approaches. However it sits increasingly uneasily with wider Government priorities to stimulate growth, including promoting the review of existing planning (s.106) agreements and suggestions in the Montague report that affordable housing requirements might be relaxed to promote the growth of private rented housing. If the recession in the construction sector is sustained CIL could be similarly vulnerable.

If it does navigate these choppy waters it will require careful and considered implementation. The Government will need to consider the balance between certainty and flexibility and, inevitably, to make further revisions to the regulations. Strategic developments, which the UK has been good at planning but poor at building, will face particular challenges and are particularly constrained by the inflexibility of the current regulations. It is likely that they will require a more flexible approach to phasing and instalments, the use of “in kind” provision of infrastructure and “exceptional circumstances” relief to a greater level than anticipated by Government and allowed by current regulations.

However it will not be enough that CIL simply does no harm. In the longer term the UK population is already increasing and ageing rapidly and this is projected to continue even if Government succeeds in reducing net immigration. This will require new homes and infrastructure the development of which, as a result of the recession, has fallen from what were already inadequate levels. To the extent that development
is genuinely held up by a lack of infrastructure there is no guarantee in the CIL regulations that this will be brought forward, even if paid for.

The Government’s reforms, brought forward under the “localism” banner, place the onus on local authorities and Local Enterprise Partnerships (“LEPs”) to take a pro-active approach to infrastructure development and growth more generally. The extent to which they are willing and able to do this will determine whether CIL can achieve its original objective of helping to increase development overall.

Structure of the Paper

The last paper on CIL was presented to this conference in 2008. Since then, despite a new Government in which the major party had promised to abolish CIL, two sets of regulations have been published and six authorities are now charging CIL. This paper seeks to bring the story up-to-date. Part 1 sets the context for CIL. This includes a (brief) recap of the familiar history of attempts to capture land value for public benefit, alongside changes over time in the planning and delivery of infrastructure. It then describes how two elements were brought together in the Barker Report, subsequent planning and housing policy, and proposals for a Planning Gain Supplement (“PGS”). It concludes with the emergence of CIL as an alternative to PGS.

Part 2 describes the implementation of CIL through the Planning Act (2008), Localism Act (2011) and subsequent regulations (2010, 2011). This includes a basic description of the CIL system, a summary of progress on charging schedules to date, and some of the key issues arising from early implementation including:

- Charge Setting (including viability assessment)
- Consultation and Review
- Relief and Exceptional Circumstances
- s.106 and regs 122 and 123

Part 3 then provides some commentary on how CIL relates to the Government’s wider objectives and ambitions for growth as set out in the National Planning Policy Framework and elsewhere, and the role of CIL as part of the wider “toolkit” for regeneration.

Part 1: The Context for CIL

Land Value, Rent and Taxation: The Most Feathers for the Least Hiss

The seventeenth century French statesman Jean Baptiste Colbert famously defined the art of taxation as: “plucking the goose so as to obtain the largest amount of feathers with the least possible amount of hissing”. This provides a pretty good description of the history of attempts at taxing land value in the UK.

Starting from first principles there is general agreement amongst economists that in a developed economy the value of land (leaving aside the buildings upon it or other investments in it) takes the form of “economic rent”. The value is derived from demand for a scarce resource not from the actions of the landowner, but instead from trends in the wider economy and its location.

It follows from this that, in theory, the taxation of land values or changes in land values should not affect the amount of land supplied to the market, and furthermore that it makes a particularly good target for taxation because it is “unearned” and because (provided the tax makes no distinction between different uses) it does not distort investment decisions between sectors.

Despite strong theoretical support, and a number of committed advocates who regard it as the solution to all taxation and other economic problems, land value taxation has never been substantially implemented
in the UK or elsewhere despite being advocated from time to time. One can understand why if one considers the political outcry that would ensue if capital gains tax were charged on the sale of first properties—which is the most obvious form of rent in the UK. The reluctance of successive Governments to update the valuations on which Council Tax is based since its introduction 20 years ago is another example of Government reluctance to tamper in property taxation for fear of provoking “hissing” from voters.

The original impetus for a land tax was driven by Henry George at the turn of the 20th century and “the land question” was closely intertwined with “new liberalism” and the emergence of town planning. Indeed the majority of the founding text of modern town planning “Garden Cities of Tomorrow” is not about design or land use, but about capturing “rent” to pay for the infrastructure and administration of the Garden City. It can be seen as the acceptable face of “Georgism” deliberately eschewing the more extreme rhetoric whilst adopting some of the key principles. The difficulty that Howard had in putting these principles into practice at Letchworth and Welwyn, despite low land prices and favourable loan funding, may give some pause for thought for current advocates of this for strategic developments but it does demonstrate the attraction of land value taxation for the early planning movement.

Subsequent discussion in planning circles has focussed on the impact of the regulation of land use through planning on the distribution of “rent”. Assuming that what the planning system allows to be built is not what the market would have done left to its own devices then Government is playing a major role in determining who will profit and who will lose from development.

The rise in the value of land simply from it being allocated for housing development rather than agriculture, without any input at all from the land owner, gives rise to what has been described as “betterment”. Conversely a neighbouring piece of land retained in agricultural use would have a lower value and, in circumstances where no controls were in place before if the use is restricted in a plan, would cause a notional loss in value to the owner, giving rise to calls for “compensation”. It is widely acknowledged that the reason for the failure of the inter-war planning system was the requirement for local authorities to compensate landowners for the loss of development rights and the difficulty in taxing betterment. Following the acceptance of the need for an effective system of land use control, as recommended by the Barlow Report, the wartime Government recognised the crucial need to tackle this fundamental problem and set up the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment (the Uthwatt Commission), whose recommendations the incoming Government largely ignored.

The 1945 Government effectively nationalised all development rights in land (without compensation but with a £300 million “hardship” fund) and introduced a Development Charge at 100 per cent of development value. This was the first of three post war attempts at a national system of “betterment taxation” but, like the others, also needs to be seen in the context of a wider package of measures, in which Government would take a pro-active role not only in planning development, but assembling sites, providing infrastructure, and directly developing sites or leasing them to developers. The ultimate sanction of Government, should landowners not wish to sell without an uplift in value, was to compulsorily purchase at Existing Use Value.

Cullingworth’s voluminous official history of the period gives an insight into the internal debates within Government, based on official records, about the implementation of the Development Charge and its ultimate abolition by the incoming Conservative Government. A number of the practical issues raised at the time find echoes in current debates on CIL.

1 Examples include the Uthwatt Commission (1942) proposing land value taxation for developed land, and the recent Mirlees Review proposed the replacement of Business Rates and Stamp Duty with a Land Value Tax (Institute for Fiscal Studies (2011), Tax by Design (The Mirlees Review), Ch.16, The Taxation of Land and Property).

2 Howard makes explicit reference to George in Ch.11, The Path Followed Up, of Garden Cities of Tomorrow (1902).

First, the legislation was broadly permissive rather than prescriptive and left the detailed issues relating to valuation to be based on accepted professional standards. Secondly, despite the fact that the Development Charge was intended to ensure that land traded at existing use values, it continued to trade at a premium, due to scarcity exacerbated by the lack of licences to build. The Government had neither the capacity nor finance to compulsorily purchase sufficient land to address this. Thirdly, there was a strong reluctance on the part of Government (and its technical advisers) to allow a lower rate of development tax, on the basis that “market values” would seep back into the land price, and ultimately drive out the ability to tax any surplus.

Anecdotal evidence of a “sellers’ strike” in land, highly publicised hardship cases of individuals who had lost out and an “in principle” opposition from the incoming 1951 Conservative Government saw the charge abolished. It should be noted that, by that time, the charge had raised substantial sums, and that the Central Land Commission which administered the charge was of the view that it was working and needed longer to prove its worth. There also continued to be strong pressure from the Chancellor and the Treasury for some form of betterment taxation.

The subsequent two Labour Governments of 1964–70 and 1974–1979, partly in response to property booms and accusations of land speculation (which were in large part the unintended consequences of other planning decisions) introduced what were in effect modified versions of the Development Charge: the Betterment Levy and the Development Land Tax. These both involved national taxation of land values, and both ultimately suffered the same fate as their predecessor, being abolished by incoming Conservative Governments.

As noted by Grant the most durable system for the capture of ‘betterment’ has been through “Planning Gain”, formalised through s.106 of the Town and Country Planning Act (1990). Although not a formal “betterment” taxation system, and to some extent limited by Government Circulars (1/97 and 05/05) and case law, the scope of contributions gradually expanded. The inclusion of Affordable Housing within the scope has had the effect, on schemes where it applies, of testing schemes to the margin of viability (based on a residual value assessment) and ‘Open Book’ appraisals are now standard practice. In this context it is fair to describe s.106 in relation to affordable housing, as Grant does, as “a national betterment taxation system hypothecated to the provision of a certain public good”.

This system has had the advantage of being integrated into the wider UK planning system. It therefore combines central guidance with local discretion and flexibility, and allows authorities to weigh the balance between different priorities—for example between affordable housing and different types of infrastructure investment. It also provides a direct link between the impacts of development and the mitigation of those impacts—an important consideration for schemes for which Environmental Assessments are required and conditions are imposed.

Over time its use matured and many local authorities adopted “tariff based” systems, based on assessments of likely impacts of development on infrastructure, including cumulative effects on transport and social and community facilities. Section 106 therefore, without a “big-bang”, became by far the most effective and durable system of “taxing” development and securing contributions to local infrastructure and, increasingly, for wider local purposes.

However, it also faced a range of criticisms. These included an alleged lack of transparency in negotiation and sometimes tenuous links to development impacts, leading to accusations of selling planning permission; uncertainty over what will be charged and high “transaction costs” in negotiating agreements; inconsistency in application across the country and lack of experience or expertise on the part of authorities in negotiating agreements; and the fact that even where they are applied many small and medium sized schemes make no contribution to infrastructure costs.

---

4 Grant (1999) Compensation and Betterment in Cullingworth, British Planning, 50 Years of Urban and Regional Policy.
5 Ashworth and Demetrius (2008), Planning Gains Supplement, Past, Present and Future
CLG has estimated that, at the peak of the boom in 2007/8, obligations worth £4.9 billion were negotiated, of which just over half (£2.6 billion) was for affordable housing. In that year authorities received payments of approximately £560 million, with affordable housing to the value of £1.3 billion delivered. It has therefore, to go back to our original theme, managed to collect a very significant amount of feathers for a very limited “hiss” compared to more formalised approaches.

The Fragmentation of Infrastructure Planning

The introduction of a comprehensive system of land use planning and development control through the 1947 Act was part of a wider historic shift in the role of Government. This involved an expansion in the role (and size) of the state including nationalisation of major industries and the foundation of the “welfare state”. This was combined with a (brief) consensus, based on wartime experience, on the need for economic and industrial as well as spatial planning.

Virtually all of those things which come under the modern definition of “infrastructure” (utilities, roads and railways, healthcare, schools and colleges) came under the direct control of Government, and for those that had previously been in its control, national Government took a greater role in setting standards. There was therefore a twin shift, from private to public, and from local to central. Government therefore had land use planning powers through the Planning Acts, and direct control over the planning and delivery of infrastructure through public ownership. The willingness, enthusiasm and ability of Government to use these powers waxed and waned over the next thirty years, but the strengths of the centralised approach can, for example, be seen in the delivery of the New Towns programme.

The position was to change decisively from 1979 onwards first with the privatisation of utilities, and subsequently with increasing fragmentation of the planning and delivery of public services across a range of providers—a trend that looks likely to continue through the current Government’s commitment to public service reform.

The table and graph below illustrate the point. Table 1 identifies some of the major items of infrastructure and the pre-1979 responsibility, current responsibility and potential future responsibility for planning and provision.

Table 1: Responsibilities for Infrastructure Delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Pre-1979</th>
<th>Current &amp; Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Central and Local Government</td>
<td>Central and Local Government. Private sector (Toll Roads)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>Nationalised Industry</td>
<td>Regulated Industry, Network Rail and Franchisees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Transport</td>
<td>Locally regulated, mixed provision</td>
<td>Limited local regulation and multiplicity of providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>Nationalised Industries with some Regional Sub-Organisation</td>
<td>Regulated Industries with multiplicity of providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>Local Government Controlled with Mixed Providers</td>
<td>Move towards individual academies, free schools and trusts accountable to Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Provision</td>
<td>NHS with changing range of sub-national structures, and GP practices</td>
<td>NHS Board, Primary Care Trusts transition to Commissioning Model, and mixed economy of providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports and Leisure</td>
<td>Direct local authority, community, voluntary and private provision</td>
<td>Contracted local authority, community and private provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks and Open Space</td>
<td>Primarily public provision</td>
<td>Public provision with increasing private provision of public space in development schemes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 shows “Gross Fixed Public Sector Capital Formation (effectively the public sector stock of infrastructure) as a proportion of national income from 1948 to 2008. Of particular note is the significant decline in public corporations due to privatisation, and the decline in the local Government share in large part due to “right to buy”. Overall the combined assets of the state sector are at about a third of their peak in the 1960s.

![Figure 1: Gross Fixed Capital Formation as a Share of National Income, 1948–2008](image)

Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies (2009), a Survey of Public Spending in the UK.

At the same time as the Government has reduced its formal role in the actual delivery of infrastructure, and significantly reduced the direct role of local authorities, it has sought to increase the importance of infrastructure in local planning.

The growth in emphasis on “Spatial Planning”, covering wider issues than simply land use allocations, was central to the planning reforms of the last decade, and the previous Government’s push for the development of “sustainable communities”. The Government policy document, Sustainable Communities: Building for the Future (2003) suggested that in order to facilitate new housing delivery, particularly in London and the South East, it would be necessary to “address public services and infrastructure needs to enable the new communities to function” (para.46).

Infrastructure Planning was given further impetus by the Barker Review of Housing Supply (2004). The review identified infrastructure as a barrier to increased housing supply, both for practical reasons where essential infrastructure, for example road access to support the delivery of a site, was not available, and also that perceived impacts on infrastructure and amenity are one of the principal sources of opposition to development from residents and local authorities. The report identified a lack of co-ordination between providers, a lack of early input from providers into the planning process (which would allow their plans to reflect likely development and site allocations, in turn, to reflect plans), and practical problems with Section 106 agreements as a mechanism to address or mitigate impacts.

As well as recommending a Planning Gain Supplement (“PGS”), which is considered further below, it also suggested the need for more co-ordination between infrastructure providers and their early involvement in the plan making process, and the need to consider the use of area based special purpose vehicles to deliver infrastructure.

In response to Barker the Government established an internal “Cross Cutting Review of Supporting Housing Growth” as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR 2007). Although the report was not published it was summarised in the CSR report itself and in the Housing Green Paper (2007) and Planning White Paper (2007). It concluded that central Government departments should prioritise infrastructure investment to support housing growth and that this should be reflected in funding decisions,
that local authorities should be formally required to take a more systematic approach to infrastructure planning and that the Government would develop “bespoke vehicles to support front funding” of infrastructure.

Infrastructure planning requirements were taken forward through revisions to Planning Policy Statement (“PPS”) 12, Local Spatial Planning 2008. This highlighted the role of spatial planning that “orchestrates the necessary social, physical and green infrastructure to ensure sustainable communities are delivered” (para.2.4).

PPS12 required that:

“The core strategy should be supported by evidence of what physical, social and green infrastructure is needed to enable the amount of development proposed for the area, taking account of its type and distribution. This evidence should cover who will provide the infrastructure and when it will be provided. The core strategy should draw on and in parallel influence any strategies and investment plans of the local authority and other organisations. (para.4.8)”

The infrastructure planning process was intended to identify infrastructure needs and costs, phasing of development and funding sources, responsibilities for infrastructure delivery and, where possible achieve the buy in from, and alignment of planning processes with, infrastructure providers.

Councils were required to demonstrate that their Core Strategies were based on sound infrastructure planning (para.4.45).

The Planning Inspectorate’s review of its experience in examining development plan documents found that “many authorities are finding infrastructure planning very challenging”. Problems included getting infrastructure providers to engage, specifying which elements of infrastructure were essential and which desirable, and the extent to which key elements, particularly early ones, can be funded. Inspectors have generally been sympathetic to local authorities’ attempts at infrastructure planning and taken a pragmatic approach to the level of evidence required.

To support infrastructure planning the Planning Advisory Service produced best practice guidance on infrastructure planning, which is cited in the PINS report, and Infrastructure Delivery Plans and Investment Frameworks are now a standard element of the evidence base for Core Strategies. As envisaged by PPS12 they also now have a wider role in providing the evidence for infrastructure needs as part of the CIL charge setting process. Advice has also been provided on infrastructure planning for major developments through ATLAS (the Advisory Team for Large Applications) and the British Property Federation.

Unfortunately for those interested in whether all of this additional planning activity would result in more infrastructure being provided, resulting in more homes being built, by the time the systems and practice guidance were in place the property market (and subsequently the wider economy) crashed. Resultant cuts in capital expenditure have meant that the capacity of public agencies to deliver infrastructure as set out in the strategies has been significantly reduced. In addition the commitments of the previous Government to “bend” mainstream funding to underpin housing development appear to have been lost amongst the new Government’s policy priorities.

Leaving aside these “timing” issues though there are some more fundamental points about the approach to infrastructure planning which raise questions about the extent to which the planning system can influence and provide for infrastructure, given the fragmentation of providers described above.

First, as noted above, there has been limited sign up from many infrastructure providers to the local frameworks. Whilst some of the more effective and advanced authorities, for example Milton Keynes, have had long term arrangements in place, the day-to-day approach to planning and delivery of infrastructure

---

7 PINS (2009), Examining Development Plan Documents, Learning from Experience.
8 PAS (2009), A steps approach to infrastructure planning and delivery.
does not appear to have changed significantly and there appear to be no real incentives to encourage agencies and organisations to change their behaviour.

Second there is a wider point about the need for additional infrastructure and the extent to which it genuinely arises from development and therefore should be provided in order to allow it to come forward. Clearly some direct infrastructure items e.g. physical access to a site or utilities/servicing for sites are essential for them to be developed. In other cases though, where needs are “generated” by an “additional” population, what development does is house that population in a particular place. The additional services would be required in any case.

In some circumstances—where there are substantial housing developments on greenfield sites or in locations where there has not been housing development in the past—there may be a clear and direct local need for provision, which it may reasonably be expected that the developer will provide. But in the case of new developments in urban areas with a growing population it is not at all clear that the demand from the population in a housing development creates additional demand in the area.

At a broader level many Infrastructure Delivery Plans apply formulae to the housing pipeline (population and child “yields”) to determine likely demand for new infrastructure. These are then treated as “net additional” population for which provision is required, and used as a basis for s.106 negotiations, and now CIL charging schedules. Leaving aside debates about betterment described above, one “good”—providing new homes or workplaces—is taxed to provide other “public goods” for which provision would be required, regardless of whether the housing was built.

In addition local authorities will often apply standards to new development that are significantly in excess of that which they are able to provide to current residents based on a “bidding up” by public service providers who look for “ideal” provision when consulted on infrastructure requirements. This was problematic at a time of high public expenditure, and appears perverse at a time of austerity. It has contributed to Infrastructure Investment Plans which require extraordinarily high levels of funding, and also to the enormous funding gaps identified in the CIL setting process. If the infrastructure requirements identified are actually necessary they must call into question whether the Plan which they support is actually deliverable. This runs the risk of bringing infrastructure planning into disrepute, and encouraging local residents and some local authorities to have unrealistic expectations of what can be, and needs to be delivered by development. We will return to this issue when considering the “residual” role of s.106 agreements in the CIL environment.

The Barker Review, Planning Gain Supplement and the Community Infrastructure Levy

The focus of the Barker Review was a drive from the Treasury to increase house-building, in part to protect the economy from the negative effects of house price inflation. As noted above the review identified both a real and perceived need for infrastructure to increase housing development. By way of context it should be remembered that in the year of the report 155,000 homes were built and annual completions were rising.

Written by an economist and sponsored by the Treasury, the review naturally picked up on the incidence of ‘rent’ (paras 7.17–7.21 of the Interim Report), and its potential taxation to help contribute to addressing those infrastructure needs. The report identified the reasons for the previous failures of development gains taxes as having been their credibility (landowners did not believe they would last), the complexity of valuing individual developments, poor targeting—with taxation falling on smaller sites and high marginal tax rates—and lack of incentive to bring land to market.

The final report (Recommendation 26) proposed a PGS with Government setting, at a national level, a tax on a proportion of the increase in land value at planning consent, covering at least estimated local authority gain from s.106 agreements (with such agreements being scaled back to focus solely on direct site based impacts of development), with variable rates for brownfield and greenfield sites, and a proportion
of funding given directly to local authorities. In effect this would have been similar to previous attempts at development land taxes, but set at a lower rate, and with some part hypothecated to provide infrastructure.

The report noted (para.33 of the Executive Summary) that, notwithstanding the fact that the incidence of the tax would mainly fall on landowners:

“In general, imposing a tax on an activity discourages its supply — but given the interaction of land supply with the planning system this effect could be expected to be small, provided that tax rate is not set at too high a level. More importantly, the proposed tax is part of a package of policies set out in this Review, which, taken together, aim to increase the supply of land and planning permissions.”

Proposals for a Planning Gain Supplement were published by the Government in 2006 and faced serious criticism from the development industry, and from professional bodies including the RTPI and the RICS. There was strong support for an approach based on a consistent and firm implementation of a “tariff” based system.

Instead, in 2007, the Government included proposals for the “Community Infrastructure Levy” in its Planning Bill, subsequently the Planning Act 2008. The Levy was essentially a halfway house between a formal Land Tax and a development based “Tariff System”, with the essential difference from the PGS that it was to be set locally, through an examination process similar to that for development plans and based on a rate per area of development, rather than directly on development value. Now, eight years after the publication of the Barker Review, and in very different economic circumstances, the Community Infrastructure Levy is finally being implemented.

**Part 2: The Community Infrastructure Levy**

*Legislation, Regulations & Guidance*

Those currently implementing, or being asked to pay, the Community Infrastructure Levy may find it ironic that one of its stated benefits is its simplicity and certainty.

Less than a year after the first charge was implemented the Levy is covered by two pieces of primary legislation, two sets of secondary legislation (regulations), with a further draft set published which are likely to be subject to further revisions, and a series of statutory and non-statutory guidance and explanatory notes.

In part these revisions are required because the regulations were published significantly in advance of the actual implementation of the charge at the local level, so both Charging Authorities, and developers who have to pay the charge, are only now testing their practicality with real world schemes. This has thrown up a number of unintended errors which include the detail of the charging formulae, the instalments policies for the Mayor of London’s CIL (which don’t currently allow the Mayor to offer instalments where there is no adopted local CIL), and the fact that s.73 applications for very minor amendments to schemes generate a CIL charge for the overall development as they constitute a new planning permission.

These issues, it is understood, will be dealt with in the revised, consolidated 2012 regulations later this year, along with the revisions required as a result of the amendments in the Localism Act. Other issues which may require amendment or correction include how outline applications with phases are dealt with and the qualifying period for floor space to be occupied in order to be taken into account in the calculation of the net increase.

Any readers who are looking for a detailed explanation of all of the ins and outs of CIL will not find it here, but should refer to the following documents:

- Part 6, Chapter 2 of the Localism Act 2011.
The Key Features of CIL

In simple terms the Community Infrastructure Levy is a fixed development charge payable for a net increase in most types of floor space, which is set when planning permission is received and payable when development commences. The charge is set and collected by the charging authority (usually the local planning authority) and is hypothecated to expenditure on infrastructure to support development. It is anticipated by Government (although not on a very scientific basis) that it will raise between £564 and £831 million per year for investment in infrastructure, and will be adopted by between two thirds and three quarters of local authorities.9

Local authorities in setting their charge “must aim to strike what appears to the charging authority to be an appropriate balance between” the desirability of funding infrastructure from CIL and “the potential effects (taken as a whole) of the imposition of CIL on the economic viability of development across its area” (author’s emphasis, but frequently pointed out by charging authorities and their advisers).

In doing so they can make use of their existing infrastructure planning evidence base, as described above, supplemented where necessary, and must demonstrate a gap between the need for infrastructure and the availability of funding from other sources to pay for it. To date this has not proved at all difficult for any authority. They must also undertake an assessment of viability using an accepted methodology. Charging guidance does not seek to provide any detail on valuation methodologies.

Similar to the Local Plan process, authorities must consult on drafts of their Charging Schedule (a Preliminary Draft Charging Schedule and a Draft Charging Schedule), prior to submitting it for independent examination. Inspectors’ reports are non-binding, although authorities may not adopt all or part of a Charging Schedule which an inspector has found requires modification. Authorities may set different charges (including zero rates) for different parts of their area, and for different types of use, although this must be based solely on evidence of viability.

However, once the Charging Schedule is adopted, the authority is very much in the driving seat. The charge is non-negotiable. There is no right of appeal against the charge itself but only the technical calculation of the charge against the formula. Although the authority may only spend income raised on

infrastructure to support development, it is not required to provide any specific items of infrastructure, and need only report on its spending. The definition of infrastructure is in any case so broad as to provide little limitation on its use, and has been widened further still in the Localism Act. It is under no obligation to review impacts on development viability, and there is no “sunset” clause. The charging authority may allow payment by instalments but is not required to do so, and may allow relief in very limited “exceptional” circumstances, but again at its own discretion. The authority has a range of enforcement powers, including the power to stop development and ultimately that debtors may be imprisoned.

Section 106 contributions were, as suggested by Barker, intended to be scaled back to those directly required for a site to be delivered (including affordable housing provision), and the tests for acceptability of contributions have been made statutory as reg.122 of the CIL regulations. In addition local authorities are limited, after 2014 to the pooling of a maximum of five s.106 contributions for any one piece, or type, of infrastructure. These changes are intended to safeguard developers, but as we shall see below, the level of re-assurance is limited given the looseness of the regulations.

Suggested Benefits of CIL and Underlying Rationale

Given the troubled history of previous attempts at betterment taxation and the high levels of contributions achieved from s.106 agreements and emerging tariff systems it is worth briefly summarising the suggested benefits that the Government has promoted, as well as some broader context on capital spending and some of the constraints and considerations (implicit and explicit) that have shaped the design of CIL.

The key benefits identified in the various Government documents arising from CIL, as compared to s.106 are threefold:

• That only a relatively small proportion of developments (the larger ones) currently make s.106 contributions. CIL can deal with the cumulative impacts of small schemes and raise additional funding to support infrastructure.

• CIL will make contributions to infrastructure more transparent, and provide speed and certainty, avoiding protracted negotiations.

• The changes under the Localism Act will ensure that local communities can benefit directly from development, thus reducing local opposition.

The design of the CIL regulations appears to be aiming to combine the local discretion, direct links to development, and consultation and “challenge” elements of the current planning system with a focus on certainty and deliberate inflexibility post-adoption to ensure that the charge becomes reflected in land prices and that landowners and developers recognise its permanence. There also appears to be a (perhaps excessive) degree of caution on the part of Government about the implications of EU State Aid rules which have clearly influenced both the insistence that viability must be the only criterion for variation of charges, and the very narrow approach to relief.

The resulting framework is arguably now the most genuinely “localist” element of the planning system, with a charge-setting process heavily weighted in favour of the authority and an implementation system the flexible elements of which are entirely at the local authority’s discretion.

An additional underlying, but largely unspoken, driver for the retention of CIL is the wider context for capital investment. Figure 2, below, shows the real terms capital budgets of the main departments responsible for delivery of the types of infrastructure provided by CIL. These have seen significant reductions (contributing to the downturn in construction output) and even when the economy stabilises are likely to remain relatively low for some years to come. Government therefore urgently needs to find alternative funding sources to provide for the needs of a growing population.
Progress to Date

In total there are 337 potential charging authorities for CIL. These are the 91 metropolitan districts and unitary authorities, the 32 London Boroughs, the Corporation of London, the Greater London Authority and Mayoral Development Corporations (currently the London Legacy Development Corporation), 201 district councils, and 10 national park authorities.

Of these six—Newark and Sherwood, Shropshire, Portsmouth, Redbridge, the Greater London Authority and Huntingdonshire—have adopted charging schedules, and Wandsworth’s has been approved by an inspector. A further 10 have published draft charging schedules and 23 Preliminary Draft Charging Schedules. This represents just over 10 per cent of authorities. There has been a wide variety of approaches with only Redbridge (adopted), Barnet (Preliminary Draft) and the Greater London Authority, using a flat rate. The remaining authorities have taken a variety of approaches including different charging zones and different charges for different types of development.

Rates have also varied significantly. As shown in Fig.3, below, early adopters have tended to be towards the lower end of the range. Unsurprisingly authorities in London and the south dominate the higher end of the spectrum with the highest proposed rate in the Wandsworth/Nine Elms area, reflecting the release of industrial land for prime residential development.
The Government, working with the Planning Advisory Service, provided a specific programme of support for a number of local authorities dubbed “Front Runners” to enable them to share best practice and identify issues and to support subsequent authorities in bringing their Charging Schedules forward. The first phase of eight front runners included four of the six authorities that have adopted their charges to date.

The remainder of this section will consider some of the general themes and issues arising from the early charge-setting process and implementation of CIL.

Charge-Setting and Viability Assessment

Much of the early discussion about CIL has been about Charge Setting and Viability as this is effectively the “front end” of the process and the stage that most Councils are currently at. Before discussing some of the issues arising from this it is worth briefly returning to the basic principle of CIL which is to secure for investment in infrastructure some of the uplift in value crystallised at planning consent. As illustrated in Fig.4, below, the overall value of a development is driven by demand. From that value the developer will need to purchase the land, pay the development costs and achieve a reasonable return. The various planning obligations, including CIL, affordable housing and any other contributions will come from that same pot. If these elements exceed the development value, development will not happen. Within this there is a debate about how one should deal with land costs, which is considered further below.

The obvious initial conclusion from this however is that, where developments are already the subject of open book appraisal, which is the case for most major sites which are the subject of affordable housing policies, there is limited scope for CIL to increase the share of development value for “community benefit”. But, depending on the level set, it could have a significant impact on affordable housing provision which becomes the residual negotiated element of the scheme. Clearly any remaining “on site” s.106
obligations—for example for community facilities or highway works—also come from the same pot and, given that only land is allowed as an in kind contribution to CIL under the present regulations, the ability to fund such items would also be limited.

The inflexibility of CIL following adoption, could therefore, have significant risks for major strategic schemes which have tended to provide affordable housing and on-site infrastructure.

![Figure 4: Development Value and Obligations Source: RICS](image)

As noted above, a Council’s viability assessment must strike a balance between funding infrastructure and impacting on the viability of development. They are required to have regard to “appropriate available evidence”, but should predominantly focus on “taking a strategic view across an area” and not the implications for specific sites. Furthermore “In view of the wide variation in local charging circumstances, it is for charging authorities to decide on the appropriate balance for their area and ‘how much’ potential development they are willing to put at risk through the imposition of CIL”. (para.7, Guidance on Charging Schedules). Whilst the examiner should consider the implications for the development plan and its targets, it is not the role of the examination to question an authority’s choice of the “appropriate balance” unless it puts development across the area at serious risk.

The way the guidance is worded therefore makes it quite possible that a District-wide appraisal based on a series of high level assumptions could be sufficient to justify the adoption of a CIL charging schedule at a rate that would make one or more strategic sites unviable. Indeed providing evidence to an examiner that your major site is unviable as a result of CIL is likely to be insufficient to demonstrate serious risk “across the area”. Most developers only have interests in specific sites in a given local authority area and it would be unreasonable to expect them to produce an alternative “area-wide” appraisal to submit to an examiner to challenge the local authority’s case. Little wonder that there has not been much appetite on the part of the private sector to engage in the charging examination process despite its obvious significance.

**Approaches to Viability Assessment**

Such debate as has taken place to date has tended to focus on the methodological aspects of viability assessment. The Charging Guidance currently states:
There are a number of valuation models and methodologies available to charging authorities to help them in preparing evidence on the potential effects of CIL on the economic viability of development across their area. There is no requirement to use one of these models, but charging authorities may find it helpful in defending their CIL rates to use one of them. (para.22)

The majority of appraisals that have been undertaken for charging schedules thus far have used what can be described as the “Existing Use Value (EUV) Plus” model for identifying the proportion of development value available to support planning obligations. On this model a land owner will need EUV plus an appropriate percentage “mark up” to be incentivised to sell land for development. The difference between the development value and this added to the development cost and return is the proportion available for planning obligations although guidance advises that schemes should not be pushed toward the margin of viability.

This approach has been criticised by some practitioners at examinations and the RICS has produced a Guidance Note to its members which proposes an alternative “Market plus Assumptions” approach to assessing the land value component of the appraisal. This states (Box 7) that:

“Site value should equate to market value subject to the following assumption: that the value has regard to development plan policies and all other material planning considerations and disregards all that is contrary to the development plan.”

In the case of CIL appraisals (Box 8) it adds:

“When undertaking Local Plan or CIL (area-wide) viability testing, a second assumption needs to be applied to the above: Site value (as defined above) may need to be further adjusted to reflect the emerging policy/CIL charging level. The level of adjustment assumes that site delivery would not be prejudiced. Where an adjustment is made, the practitioner should set out their professional opinion underlying the assumptions adopted. These include, at a minimum, comments on the state of the market and delivery targets at the date of assessment.”

Critics have pointed out that inputting land price at the outset arguably undermines the purpose of CIL, in that it is intended to effectively tax the land price, but to a level which land will still come forward for development. Paragraph 3.3.6 of the guidance note appears to acknowledge this (although the wording is rather opaque) by suggesting that there is a “spectrum” in area wide assessments and that the weight given to existing market value should reflect this. It does however assert that there is a ‘boundary’ to this spectrum so that the effect of policy does not result in a reduction in value which would “provide a competitive return to a willing landowner”. In this context the difference in principle between a percentage uplift on an existing use value and a percentage reduction on a current market value is not entirely clear. Presumably they meet somewhere?

The RICS guidance is not the only recent publication to seek to throw light on the issue of viability. The Local Housing Delivery Group, chaired by John Harman and involving public and private sector representatives has also published guidance on viability testing for local plans. This broadly sets out the approach that has emerged as “best practice” from viability assessments to support local plan policies to date. This includes the suggestion that the Threshold Land Value—the value required to see land brought forward for development—“is based on a premium over current use values and credible alternative use values” although it acknowledges that local information on market values and transactions will be helpful to determine this threshold level.

Whilst this may be seen as an endorsement of the approach taken in early CIL viability assessments, it is also clear that most fall well short of the best practice described in the document, particularly in relation

to the testing of sites critical to the delivery of the plan, the level of consultation and agreement on approach with key stakeholders, the detail and range of data used and a proper assessment of the costs of other requirements and obligations that may be placed on developments. In part this is because the CIL charging guidance actively discourages the consideration of individual sites, and makes no reference to the importance of sites which are critical to the delivery of the plan.

The debate illustrates two conflicting issues described earlier in relation to the initial post war development charge.

On the one hand in conditions of scarcity, as will continue to be the case in high demand areas, land tends to trade at a margin above current development value due to competition from developers who see their expertise in producing the potential for an additional margin, because of general “hope value” and, for the time being at least, the “flight to quality” amongst investors. Thus if EUV plus models leave too low a margin, even if obligations are a relatively small proportion of development cost they may deter development. This would imply the need for use of market benchmarks.

On the other hand, the observation that “market values” seep upwards into land prices, reducing the proportion that may be taxed is clearly a risk with the ‘market value plus assumptions’ approach. The theory of CIL assumes that it will, by definition, secure some share of the current market value. In addition to this the literal application of planning policy requirements (particularly affordable housing) to many schemes, if then subtracted from market value would often result in a value below current EUV.

To date examiners have been reluctant to get involved in debates on appraisal methodology. The examiner’s report for the Mayor of London’s CIL (Mayoral Draft CIL Charging Schedule, Examiner’s Report January 2012) explicitly referred to representations on the merits of the methods described above and concluded that EUV plus was a reasonable method to use. This debate is likely to continue, particularly now that the RICS has published its guidance. The City of London Corporation has employed consultants who are seeking to use the “market value plus assumptions” approach to viability assessment and it will be interesting to see whether this results in different levels of proposed CIL to neighbouring authorities, although given the unique nature of the City property market, they may not in any case be directly comparable.

**Appropriate Available Evidence**

Possibly of more immediate concern is the lack of definition in the guidance of what constitutes “appropriate available evidence”. The Charging Guidance makes reference to information on land values and property market reports. It also suggests that local authorities may wish to undertake some “limited sampling” of sites, but they are under no obligation to do so.

As noted above CIL is probably a greater risk to larger strategic sites which have abnormal costs and may be required to provide substantial on site infrastructure as well as significant levels of affordable housing. Many local authorities have information on the viability of such sites from previous open book appraisals, but are under no obligation to use such information, or even to consider site specific issues. Such sites are particularly important to the delivery of councils’ housing pipelines. Research by Savills (2011) suggests that 45 per cent of local authorities’ five year housing pipelines is in such sites and many face significant viability issues.

Some authorities have reviewed CIL charges against previous appraisals and other market knowledge and paid particular concern to key strategic development locations. However the lack of requirement to do so and the implication in the Charging Guidance that authorities can choose to render some development unviable must be a concern and a potential conflict with the requirement to meet objectively assessed needs and support growth set out in the National Planning Policy Framework.

---

13 Savills Research (2011) Spotlight on Strategic Development Sites.
Issues around impacts on strategic sites have been raised in a number of the CIL examinations. The general approach taken by examiners has been (in a number of cases word for word) similar to the following quote from the Huntingdonshire Examination report\textsuperscript{14}, namely:

“the Council has made it clear that the economic viability of any scheme that is otherwise acceptable in all other respects would be assessed for all other possible non CIL contributions on an overall basis. This would mean taking into account the fixed CIL liability first and then, if necessary, where the overall viability is in genuine doubt, any further site specific infrastructure needs in a flexible and negotiated process. With this in mind it is reasonable to conclude that the standard rate should not materially reduce the delivery of new housing through insufficient profitability for developers, in most cases, including on the larger sites.”

As noted above the other elements to be negotiated would be affordable housing and other on-site infrastructure. It is not clear from this conclusion whether such schemes would genuinely be deliverable, and therefore meet the “soundness” tests for a strategic site in a local plan.

\textit{Relief and Exceptional Circumstances}

The CIL regulations allow for three forms of relief: Charitable Relief, Social Housing Relief and Exceptional Circumstances relief.

Like all aspects of CIL, things are not as simple as they may first seem. First, although it is commonly suggested that all affordable housing is automatically “exempt” it is not. Applicants have to calculate their liability and apply for the relief, which does not cover all products which currently meet the definition of affordable housing, although this is intended to be rectified in updated regulations. In relation to charitable relief, there are three types, one mandatory and two discretionary, but they do not necessarily cover all of the activities of “charitable bodies”.

Exceptional circumstances relief is only allowed in very narrow circumstances. This is ostensibly for two reasons: first because relief from a “tax” can constitute “State Aid”; and second because the Government does not want CIL to become seen as a “negotiable item”, partly to address the concern for the credibility and certainty of the charge with developers and landowners.

Exceptional circumstances relief is therefore only available if the charging authority has decided that it wishes to offer relief and considers that:

\begin{itemize}
  \item the cost of complying with the s.106 agreement is greater than the charge from the levy payable on the chargeable development;
  \item requiring payment of the charge would have an unacceptable impact on the economic viability of the chargeable development; and
  \item granting relief would not constitute a notifiable State Aid.
\end{itemize}

As noted above, depending on where the CIL level is set, most schemes which include a significant proportion of affordable housing and which have been subject to viability assessment would probably meet the first and second tests.

The issue of State Aid could be the subject of a separate paper in itself. Both central and local Government are extremely risk averse to the prospect of state aid challenge, and this has influenced a number of the parts of the CIL regulations including requirements for differential charges to be based on evidence of viability and limitations on the use of “in kind” contributions as well as rules on relief. The requirement for a planning obligation to be equal to the notional CIL charge for exceptional circumstances relief to

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Report On The Examination Of The Draft Huntingdonshire Community Infrastructure Levy Charging Schedule} (2012).

apply may result from a desire to demonstrate that the applicant is not receiving an advantage because they are making contributions of at least as much as a notional competitor who was required to pay CIL.

It is for the Charging Authority to determine whether this constitutes ‘State Aid’ under EU law, and if it did whether it was below “de minimis levels” (€200,000 to any one undertaking over three years, assuming that Euros still exist by then).

Where relief is granted other reliefs (e.g. affordable housing or charitable relief) are not available and commencement of development must happen within one year of relief being granted. To date the Mayor of London has chosen not to allow exceptional circumstances relief, but other authorities have.

Consultation and Review

The regulations provide for statutory consultation periods, when the Preliminary Draft Charging Schedule is published and when the Draft Charging Schedule is published. Interested parties also have the right to be heard at the examination. Of the seven examinations held to date six have had public hearings, with one being undertaken in writing.

Experience to date suggests that there has been little change in the contents of Charging Schedules between the publication of Preliminary Drafts and the finally adopted versions. There have been some minor tweaks to charges for certain uses, and to the boundaries of charging zones. This is again likely to contribute to the lack of interest of the development industry in engaging with the process.

Some authorities have gone beyond the basic requirements set out in the regulations by holding consultation meetings with interested parties on their approach to viability assessment and using “developer sounding boards”. Developers with a significant interest in an area are well advised to engage with the authority at the earliest opportunity, and also to consider “deliverability” issues, such as payment by instalment, exceptional circumstances relief and site specific issues as, although these are not a matter for the charge setting process, they can have a significant impact on individual developments.

In addition to consultation in the charge setting process, a number of authorities are committed to going significantly beyond the basic monitoring requirements set out in the regulations and provide detailed delivery plans for infrastructure and seek commitments from partners to work with them to ensure that it is provided. In addition some authorities, Wandsworth and Newark and Sherwood for example, have committed to a three year review of the adoption of CIL—which will coincide with the Government’s commitment to review CIL as a whole in 2015.

Section 106, and Regulations 122 and 123

Regulations 122 and 123 are intended to provide re-assurance for developers that they won’t be required to contribute more than once for the same piece of infrastructure and that s.106 contributions will be scaled back.

Regulation 122 gives, for the first time, a statutory basis for the tests that a planning obligation should be necessary, directly related to the development, and fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the development. Nevertheless, given current approaches to Environmental Assessment and the scope and requirements of mitigation, it is far from clear that this places any significant limits on planning obligations.

Regulation 123 requires local authorities to either produce a list of “relevant infrastructure” now commonly known as a “Regulation 123 list”, on which CIL may be spent and for which they may not charge s.106 contributions, or, if they do not produce a list, not to charge s.106 for anything.

It also limits the pooling of planning obligations to five for any one item, or type, of infrastructure after a CIL charging schedule has been adopted, or 2014, whichever is the sooner. This is intended both as an incentive to local authorities to adopt CIL, by effectively outlawing “tariff” systems, and a safeguard to
developers in ‘scaling back’ obligations. In practice local authorities have interpreted the regulation as allowing them to pool up to five obligations for each single piece of infrastructure and each type, enabling them to receive up to five payments for schools generally and five for specific schools as part of developments. This would appear to largely negate the purpose of the regulation.

Regulation 123 lists need not contain more than one item of infrastructure. Some list detailed specific infrastructure schemes, but others, for example Redbridge, have a high level list of headings but reserve the right to charge for specific items which might come under the generic headings (e.g. a specific school) through s.106 if it is regarded as directly mitigating the impacts of the scheme. In effect this approach, which is legally consistent with the regulations, removes any safeguards that developers may be thought to have had in relation to limitations on s.106 requirements.

Regulation 123 lists have no formal link with the infrastructure planning process or the definition of what CIL may be spent on by local authorities. They are only required when a CIL charging schedule comes into force, may be revised at any time, and are therefore not considered as part of the charge setting process. This effectively means that it is not possible during the charge setting process to have confidence that assumptions in the viability assessment about the (usually low) assumed residual levels of s.106 requirements are accurate.

Part 3: The Wider Challenge

The introduction of CIL should not be regarded as an end in itself. When it was originally conceived it was intended as part of a co-ordinated package of actions which would release more land for housing, provide additional infrastructure, and therefore help support additional housing growth.

In its final incarnation it has become a tool to support all kinds of growth, and is no longer focussed on uplift in value on greenfield housing sites. Since the 2010 General Election there have also been significant wider reforms to the planning system and, at least in rhetorical terms, a commitment to a transformed role for local government and local communities in shaping and delivering development.

This final section therefore considers CIL in the context of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) and the wider drive towards “localism”.

CIL and the NPPF

As we have noted above the current guidance on producing Charging Schedules for CIL makes limited reference to Local Plans, actively discourages any consideration of strategic sites, and allows local authorities to set CIL at a level which may result in an unspecified level of development not being brought forward provided it does not jeopardise “development across the area”.

Such an approach may work in the case of a city-wide CIL charge pitched at a relatively low level and contribute to a single piece of strategic infrastructure as is the case with the Mayor’s CIL in London but would, arguably, be inappropriate and contrary to the thrust of other policy objectives for local authorities in seeking to encourage and facilitate growth, and particularly the delivery of key sites.

This dis-connect is further emphasised by the adoption of the NPPF which says that Local Plans must “meet objectively assessed development and infrastructure requirements”, be based on evidence and be deliverable. (p.182) It requires authorities to identify key sites critical to the delivery of the strategy, including “deliverable” sites (with a buffer) for the first 5 years of the strategy and “developable” sites or broad locations for the following 5–10 years. (para.47) It also requires local authorities to identify strategic employment sites.

The NPPF has a strong focus on viability and deliverability. It suggests that the “cumulative impact of these standards and policies (all obligations including affordable housing and CIL) should not put
implementation of the plan at serious risk, and should facilitate development throughout the economic cycle.” (para.174)

In relation to CIL it explicitly states that: “Where practical, Community Infrastructure Levy charges should be worked up and tested alongside the Local Plan. The Community Infrastructure Levy should support and incentivise new development, particularly by placing control over a meaningful proportion of the funds raised with the neighbourhoods where development takes place.” (para.175) It also suggests that affordable housing and infrastructure costs need to be assessed at plan making stage and kept under review.

The combination of these policies means that local authorities will need to make a proper assessment of the deliverability of their plan, including an assessment of all obligations, with a focus on strategic sites. The corollary of this is that where local authorities have set inappropriate CIL levels or not taken into account properly their potential impacts on strategic sites, they will either have to reduce other requirements, notably affordable housing, or face challenges to their plans or appeals against other obligations, or sites with fewer abnormal costs than typically “brownfield” or “regeneration” sites. Effectively authorities will have a choice between a Viability/Deliverability “Merry-go Round” as illustrated in Fig.5, or a co-ordinated approach to plan making and the setting of obligations as shown in Fig.6. Clearly, given the imperative for Charging Schedules to be adopted by 2014, such a co-ordinated approach will take time to become aligned, but in the meantime it would be sensible for the CIL charge setting and review process to have regard to the delivery of sites critical to the delivery of the plan and to have tailored approaches to the delivery of critical infrastructure of those sites agreed with developers.

![Figure 5](image-url)
Readers will have picked up a note of scepticism about the ability of the “rational planning” model of infrastructure delivery described in the context section above to actually plan for the right infrastructure and ensure that it gets built. In addition, in areas without new greenfield sites or “mega” regeneration schemes it’s difficult to see whether it’s either possible, or indeed useful, to try to distinguish between demand for infrastructure generated by the population of a development, and that required anyway by a rapidly expanding population, or to support a modern economy.

Provided that the first call on development value through planning obligations and CIL is used to deal with “showstoppers” for that development (otherwise it will never be realised as development will not be commenced) and that consequently “significant impacts” are deemed to be mitigated, both developers
and authorities should probably be more relaxed about whether expenditure on wider needs is the result of the “cumulative impacts” of development or simply to meet local needs and aspirations.

This is not to play down the role of local authorities (or groups of local authorities, or LEPs or other delivery vehicles). Indeed with the fragmentation of infrastructure delivery, the local level is probably the only place where such things can now be joined up, as a number of the CIL Front Runners have shown. Rather than, as happened previously, producing reams of plans and prospectuses, the most effective role of central Government is to co-ordinate the large scale investments for which it is responsible and to incentivise utilities (and possibly their regulators) to engage in local infrastructure delivery.

For local authorities CIL will be only one of a number of potential funding sources that they will need to consider in seeking to invest in infrastructure in their areas. The potential for Business Rate Retention, new mechanisms for investment such as Tax Increment Financing and the reform of Council Housing finance and the New Homes Bonus will in some places be more important than the potential of CIL, which is likely to be of most significance in places of relatively high land value where by definition there is “rent” to capture. On major schemes business rate retention alone could be worth multiples of what would be likely to be available from CIL and councils will need to consider the relative merits of different funding sources carefully.

To date only Bristol and Newcastle of the “Core Cities” have published draft charging schedules for CIL. However, it is likely that in these places CIL will form a small part of a wider package of investment as is likely to be the case in Manchester and its “City Deal” agreed with the Government, which includes a long term infrastructure fund secured against future growth. On the other hand, in high value areas like Wandsworth, there may be sufficient value for CIL to help underpin a Tax Increment Financing model for investment in the proposed London Underground extension. In other areas CIL might be part of the new “Garden Cities” model, which would take us full circle to the original UK approach to capturing betterment.

It needs to be recognised that, if this happens, it will be a long term shift and will require Government to follow through on its commitment to provide more financial freedom for local authorities, which will not be easy when the priority is to reduce pubic borrowing. At the same time it will require local authorities to change their mindset from one where they are responding to the latest central Government initiative to one where they seek to determine their own destiny. It also provides significant risks to those authorities facing particularly difficult economic circumstances, and those that do not have the capacity to respond.

It is likely that those authorities that make it work are those whose first question is “how can we use CIL to help deliver development?”, not “how can we maximise income from CIL?”.